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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND HEALTHCARE REFORM: THE 
MEDICARE PART D ”CLAWBACK” EXAMPLE 
ELIZABETH A. WEEKS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In spring 2006, several states petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court to hear a challenge under its original jurisdiction to one piece of the 
new Medicare Part D prescription drug law.1  Before Part D implementation, 
individuals who qualified for both Medicare and Medicaid received their 
prescription drug coverage through state Medicaid programs.2  Part D 
requires these dually eligible beneficiaries to enroll in the new federal 
Medicare program instead of state Medicaid programs for drug coverage.3  
This legislation gave the federal government control over prescription drug 
coverage for dually eligible beneficiaries but requires states perpetually to 
pay most of the cost of those beneficiaries’ drugs.4 
The “phased-down state contribution,” or “clawback,” is a unique 
example of cooperative federalism.5  The federal government claimed credit 
 
* Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law.  This Article would not have been 
possible without the other authors, editors, organizers of and signatories to the Professors’ 
Amicus Brief in Texas v. Leavitt:  Nicole Huberfeld, Ted Marmor, Steve Calandrillo, Molly 
Wood, Mark Walters, Carla Cox, Christopher Murgica, Sean Jordan, Adam Aston, and Bill 
Davis.  I am also indebted to Rick Levy, Rob Glicksman, Steve McAllister, Steve Ware, Mike 
Wells, Jack Preis, and Frank Thompson for comments on earlier drafts of the Brief and this 
Article and to my research assistants, Laura Ward, Neal Johnson, and Eunice Lee for their 
tireless assistance. 
 1. See generally Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Supporting Brief, and Bill of 
Complaint, Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S.Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.) (No. 135) [hereinafter States’ 
Brief]. The Petitioner States were Texas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, and New Jersey. 
 2. See Daniel A. Cody, Trouble on the Horizon? Medicare Part D and Dual Eligibles, 18 
HEALTH LAWYER 27, 27 (2005). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 28. 
 5. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815, 
815 n.2 (1998) (citing “voluminous literature” on “cooperative federalism” and suggesting 
that this approach to policymaking “offers us a vision of independent governments working 
together to implement federal policy”); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
80 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:79 
for expanding Medicare to cover prescription drugs and retained 
administrative and budgetary control over the new program.6  States, 
meanwhile, were left footing the bill for the federal programs but were 
denied any control, discretion, or ability to respond to constituents’ concerns 
about their state budget appropriations for the new program’s cost.7  In 
effect, the clawback requires states to allocate an undeterminable amount of 
their state budgets to fund a fully federal program.  In challenging the 
clawback, the States’ U.S. Supreme Court Petition raised various 
constitutional arguments, including intergovernmental tax immunity, anti-
commandeering, and the Guarantee Clause.8  The States also asserted 
grounds on which the Court should take the unusual step of exercising 
original jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.9  Specifically, the States urged 
that the potentially staggering and immediate state budgetary impact of the 
clawback necessitated a speedy and final resolution of the issues.10 
The 2007 Saint Louis University Health Law Symposium offered a unique 
opportunity to examine a wide range of issues raised by the implementation 
of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
(the MMA).11  The MMA effected the largest expansion of Medicare since 
the program began, including, most notably, outpatient prescription drug 
coverage.12  Some contributions to this Symposium provided broad policy 
perspectives on the landmark legislation and its effect on beneficiaries, 
providers, taxpayers, insurers, and the public.  This Article, by contrast, 
offers a focused examination of a relatively minor, and perhaps largely 
overlooked, funding provision.  The clawback is significant, nonetheless, 
because it represents a unique approach to shared responsibility between 
 
the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 205 (1997) 
(describing “cooperative federalism” and Congress’s historical reliance on states “to 
implement the goals and controls of federal policy”); Symposium on Cooperative Federalism: 
Foreword, 23 IOWA L. REV. 455, 456 (1938) (discussing recent “experimentation in 
federalism” through legislation “characterized by the participation of several governments in 
cooperative legislative or administrative action”). 
 6. See Press Release, John Lynch, Governor of N.H., Governor Announces New 
Hampshire Joins Other States in Challenging Medicare “Clawback” Provision (Mar. 3, 2006), 
at www.nh.gov/governor/news/2006/030306clawback.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). 
 7. William G. Weissert & Edward A. Miller, Punishing the Pioneers: The Medicare 
Modernization Act and State Pharmacy Assistance Programs, 35 PUBLIUS 115, 139-40 (2005). 
 8. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 5-20. 
 9. Id. at 5. 
 10. Id. at 21. 
 11. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. IV 2004)). 
 12. Rick Mayes, Medicare and America’s Healthcare System in Transition: From the 
Death of Managed Care to the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and Beyond, 38 J. 
HEALTH L. 391, 393 (2005). 
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the federal and state governments but lacks the hallmarks of cooperative 
and consensual federalism.13  It was highly objectionable to many states, 
spawning constitutional U.S. Supreme Court litigation.14  I, together with 
several other health law professors and practitioners, submitted an amicus 
brief in support of the States’ Petition.15  Although the Supreme Court 
declined to hear the States’ challenge to this unprecedented funding 
mechanism,16 the clawback remains constitutionally suspect and presents 
important questions for cooperative state-federal health reform. 
II.  PART D OF THE MMA 
In 2003, Congress enacted the MMA,17 adding, for the first time since 
the program began in 1965, coverage for outpatient prescription drugs.18  
The absence of outpatient prescription drug coverage under Medicare was 
a relic of the political and medical climate in which the program was 
envisioned.19  Medicare was originally intended to cover catastrophic, rather 
than routine, healthcare costs, much like a true insurance plan.20  The 
program’s core components, Part A for hospital services and Part B for 
physician services, were based roughly on the early Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield plans, which did not cover prescription drugs.21  In addition, 
pharmaceutical research and the importance of pharmacotherapy in disease 
treatment were relatively rudimentary when Medicare began.22  The lack of 
 
 13. See generally Sarnoff, supra note 5 (discussing cooperative federalism). 
 14. States’ Brief, supra note 1. 
 15. Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Health Law as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs, Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S. Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.) (No. 135) [hereinafter Professors’ 
Brief]. 
 16. Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S.Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.). 
 17. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. IV 2004)). 
 18. See Thomas R. Barker, The Low-Income Subsidy in the New Medicare Drug Benefit, 1 
J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 49, 50-52 (2005) (summarizing historical Medicare drug 
coverage); Susan A. Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003: Will it be Good Medicine for U.S. Health Policy?, 14 ELDER L.J. 
237, 241 (2006) (noting historical lack of outpatient drug benefit). 
 19. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 10-15, 
371-72 (1997) (describing historical background and political compromises required for 
passage of Medicare program). 
 20. See Thomas R. Oliver et al., A Political History of Medicare and Prescription Drug 
Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283, 290-91 (2004) (discussing the initial Democratic and 
Republican proposals for a senior health insurance plan and the ultimate adoption of 
Medicare, which provided hospital insurance and supplementary medical insurance). 
 21. Channick, supra note 18, at 241 n.18; ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 19, at 14-15. 
 22. See Shannon Cadres, The Citizens Health Prescription: Coping with Rising Drug 
Costs, 18 NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL’Y 49, 51 (2002) (noting that Medicare’s lack of outpatient 
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Medicare coverage for outpatient drugs became increasingly conspicuous 
as drug therapy became an essential intervention and the standard of care 
for many diseases and chronic conditions.23  Moreover, most other insurers, 
including many private health insurance and managed care plans as well as 
Medicaid, the government indigent healthcare program, covered 
prescription drugs.24  Finally, with much fanfare, Congress extended 
Medicare coverage to prescription drugs under Medicare Part D.25 
A little-noticed and last-minute addition to the Part D federal drug plan 
requires states to pay a portion of the costs of the new benefit.26  This 
provision, dubbed the “phased-down state contribution” in the statute, and 
commonly referred to as the clawback, demands state payments for a 
federal benefit.27  If a state fails to remit the required clawback amount, the 
federal government will automatically offset the amount demanded, plus 
interest, against the federal dollars otherwise due to the state under the 
Medicaid program.28 
The combination of the Part D clawback and automatic offset effects an 
unprecedented change in the core funding and administrative structures of 
two distinct government programs: Medicare and Medicaid.  Medicare, 
since its enactment, has been a fully federal program.29  Because of the Part 
D clawback, a substantial portion of the program now is funded by state 
contributions.30  The clawback also alters Medicaid, a government welfare 
 
drug coverage “went virtually unnoticed” in 1965, “when prescription drugs were a relatively 
small part of overall healthcare costs not typically covered by private insurance plans”). 
 23. See id. at 51-52 (quoting a Massachusetts pharmaceutical industry source as stating 
that “[p]harmaceuticals are about 10 percent of healthcare spending, but they are probably 
about 70 percent of the cure”). 
 24. See Oliver et al., supra note 20, at 285, 291, & 293 (noting that Medicare’s 
omission of a drug benefit “prompted the development of other sources of coverage,” 
including Medicaid and private insurance). 
 25. See generally The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. IV 
2004)). 
 26. Louise M. Slaughter, Medicare Part D – The Product of a Broken Process, 354 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2314, 2314-15 (2006) (describing conference committee deliberations and the 
3:00 a.m. vote, including a provision requiring “[s]tates, already overburdened by health care 
costs, . . . to partially fund Part D”). 
 27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2004); Channick, supra note 18, at 245-
46 (“The MMA contains a provision, colloquially known as the ‘clawback,’ that essentially 
requires the states to subsidize a benefit granted to Medicare beneficiaries by federal 
legislation, administered by federal agencies, and operated by private-sector entities.”); Cody, 
supra note 2, at 28 (describing clawback). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C). 
 29. See Judith Feder et al., Long-Term Care in the United States: An Overview, 19 
HEALTH AFF. 40, 48 (2000). 
 30. See Cody, supra note 2, at 28. 
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program that gives federal financial support to states that voluntarily 
establish and administer their own programs, as long as the programs 
comply with certain federal requirements.31  The effect of the clawback and 
automatic offset penalty is that states must comply with an onerous, new 
condition on federal Medicaid dollars.  Specifically, they must perpetually 
fund a portion of Medicare, a distinct and separate federal program that is 
wholly out of states’ fiscal, administrative, and legislative control, in order to 
receive the full federal Medicaid contribution. 
A. Overview of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs 
Medicare is a fully federal program that provides health insurance to 
elderly, disabled, and end-stage renal disease patients.32  Medicare covers 
hospital services under Part A33 and physician services under Part B.34  The 
new Part D adds coverage for outpatient prescription drugs,35 which the 
program never before covered.36  Medicare is funded from mandatory 
payroll taxes, federal general revenue, and beneficiary-paid premiums and 
deductibles.37  States, traditionally, have had no fiscal responsibility for or 
administration over the federal Medicare program.38 
Congress enacted Medicaid at the same time as Medicare, intending 
Medicaid to be a welfare program to provide healthcare to the needy, 
including individuals impoverished by staggeringly high medical expenses.39  
Medicaid is a joint state-federal program that accords states considerable 
 
 31. Kenneth R. Wiggins, Medicaid and the Enforceable Right to Receive Medical 
Assistance: The Need for a Definition of “Medical Assistance”, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1487, 
1489-90 (2006). 
 32. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Medicare: Medicare Eligibility Tool (2007), 
at www.medicare.gov/MedicareEligibility/Home.asp?dest=NAV|Home|GeneralEnrollment 
#TabTop (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to i-5 (2000). 
 34. Id. §§ 1395j to w-4. 
 35. Id. §§ 1395w-101 to w-152 (Supp. IV 2004). 
 36. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 134 n.50 (describing the new Medicare Part 
D, original Parts A and B, and Part C managed care model). 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395e, 1395s  (2000); id. § 1395r  (Supp. IV 2004); id.§ 401 
(Supp. IV 2004). 
 38. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 374-75 (1982) 
(discussing the original structure of Medicare and the federal government’s fiscal 
responsibilities). 
 39. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1981) (describing enactment 
of Medicaid program); Brogan v. Miller, 537 F. Supp. 139, 142 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Channick, 
supra note 18, at 273 (describing history of Medicaid); Sara Rosenbaum et al., Public Health 
Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution from Medicaid to SCHIP, 1 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 7-8 (2004) (characterizing Medicaid as “an ‘afterthought’ to Medicare, and 
a ‘relegation’ to states of responsibility for insuring the poor”). 
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discretion over eligibility requirements and program benefits.40  The federal 
Medicaid statute requires states to cover certain beneficiaries and services, 
but states can expand eligibility and services beyond the federal 
requirements.41  Eligibility, which also varies by state, is generally based on 
income and/or medical condition or other “categorical” eligibility 
requirements.42  As long as states comply with certain broad federal 
requirements, they receive federal matching dollars to support their state 
Medicaid programs.43  Each dollar a state spends on federally approved 
Medicaid programs, whether required or optional, is matched by federal 
funds on a percentage basis determined by the state’s relative poverty.44  At 
the time the MMA was passed, all states operated Medicaid programs and 
provided some level of outpatient prescription drug coverage, even though 
the federal Medicaid statute does not require states to provide that benefit.45 
Medicare eligibility is tied to Social Security pension eligibility and is 
based on statutorily defined requirements of prior employment or current 
disability.46  Medicare eligibility and benefits are not based on income.47  In 
other words, Medicare does not means test; rich and poor beneficiaries 
qualify on the same terms and receive the same benefits.  It was never 
 
 40. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 39, at 7-8 (noting that “Medicaid is the largest 
surviving public means-tested legal entitlement” and “entitles states to open-ended federal 
financial assistance for the cost of dozens of classes of federally recognized health services 
furnished to eligible and enrolled persons”). 
 41. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A 
Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 857 (1990) (noting that “[b]ecause states 
have great flexibility . . . the Medicaid program is really 50 very different programs serving 
different populations and providing different benefits”). 
 42. See Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 37 (describing “categorically” and “medically” needy 
beneficiaries); Kinney, supra note 41, at 865-68 (describing Medicaid eligibility); Sara 
Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit Reduction 
Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 12-13 (2006) (describing Medicaid eligibility and 
coverage); Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
7, 17-19  (2001) (same). 
 43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2000) (regarding payments to states). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (describing 
“cooperative federalism” approach enacted “to provide federal financial assistance for all 
legitimate state expenditures under an approved Medicaid plan”). 
 45. See Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications 
for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 445 (2008) (noting that 
“states historically have covered drug expenses for dual eligibles through Medicaid”); Weissert 
& Miller, supra note 7, at 118 (“Although it is an optional benefit, all states have elected to 
provide at least some level of pharmaceutical coverage under Medicaid.”); Richard Cauchi, 
State’s Rx for Medicare Gaps, ST. LEGISLATURES, Mar. 2006, at 28,28 (describing states’ 
programs to fill prescription drug gap in federal Medicare program). 
 46. See 42 U.S.C. § 426(a)-(b) (2000). 
 47. See id. 
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intended as a welfare program for needy people, but rather, as a pension 
and health insurance program for workers.48  The MMA, however, changed 
Medicare’s fundamental parity notion by adding lower-end means testing 
for Part D drug plan subsidies and upper-end means testing for Part B 
physician service premiums.49  For the first time since the program’s 
enactment, poor Medicare beneficiaries may be eligible for additional 
government support while wealthy beneficiaries may pay more than others 
for the care that they receive. 
Under the MMA, Medicare beneficiaries may also receive different 
outpatient prescription drug coverage, depending on which plan they 
elect.50  The Bush administration’s idea was for private health plans to 
compete for program beneficiaries as a way of promoting cost containment 
and quality through market principles.51  To succeed in offering choices and 
promoting competition among plans, the new program had to attract a 
number of private health plans to participate.52  To make the program 
attractive to private health plans, the administration had to enroll a sufficient 
volume of beneficiaries.53 
 
 48. See Channick, supra note 18, at 258-59 (noting that prior to Medicare, it was 
uncommon for employers to set up health insurance for retired workers, and Medicare was 
thus “intended to ensure access to health insurance for the retired elderly who have few other 
options.”) 
 49. Timothy S. Jost, The Most Important Health Care Legislation of the Millenium (So 
Far): The Medicare Modernization Act, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 437, 445 (2005). 
 50. See Barker, supra note 18, at 54 (describing unique Part D benefit delivery through 
private insurers, unlike traditional Medicare delivery through federal agency). 
 51. See Channick, supra note 18, at 243 n.28 (describing private market underpinnings 
of Part D benefit); Robert Dodge, Bush’s Free-Market Medicare Plan Draws Fire from 
Democrats: Drug Benefits, HMO and PPO Proposals Offered, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 
5, 2003, at 4A (describing a competitive model in which “beneficiaries force providers to offer 
their best coverage at the lowest prices with competing plans” and noting the Democrats’ 
questioning of the Administration’s suggestion that free-market forces will contain costs); 
Christopher Snowbeck, Medicare Drug Plan Brings More Choices: Health-Care Competition 
Gets Hot as Prescription Program Gets Set to Begin, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, June 23, 2005, 
at E1 (describing private plans’ strategies to attract seniors to new Part D plans). 
 52. See Robert Pear, In Medicare Debate, Massaging the Facts, N.Y TIMES, May 23, 
2006, at A21 (“The number of prescription drug plans – 40 or more in most states – has far 
exceeded expectations.  Premiums are lower than expected, partly because insurers obtained 
larger discounts in negotiations with drug manufacturers.”).  But see William M. Welch, 
Medicare Measure Becomes Law Today, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 2003, at 14A (noting that plan 
“relies on untested assumptions that private insurers will step in to provide subsidized 
policies”). 
 53. See generally Peter B. Bach & Mark B. McClellan, The First Months of the 
Prescription-Drug Benefit – A CMS Update, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2312 (2006) 
(summarizing plan choices and enrollment numbers, including dual-eligibles, and noting that 
“[o]f the [forty-two] million beneficiaries eligible for drug coverage, more than [thirty-one] 
million were enrolled in a plan by early May 2006”). 
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Part D enrollment is optional for most Medicare beneficiaries.54  Those 
who elect to enroll pay a premium and can choose from a variety of plans, 
including a government-provided option.55  For some Medicare 
beneficiaries, however, Part D enrollment is not optional.  Beneficiaries who 
meet both Medicare and Medicaid eligibility requirements, called dual 
eligibles, must enroll in Part D.56  As discussed above, before the MMA all 
states covered outpatient drugs under their Medicaid plans.  But Part D 
mandated that all dually eligible beneficiaries switch from their existing state 
Medicaid drug plans to the new federal Part D drug plans.57  The 
justification for the clawback, it seems, is that states would not be in any 
different position since they were already paying those drug costs.  Now they 
would just pay the federal government, rather than their Medicaid 
pharmaceutical providers, the same amount; nothing gained and nothing 
lost.58  From the federal government’s perspective, pulling all dual-eligibles 
into Part D would increase the beneficiary rolls and attract plans to compete 
for the enrollees’ drug plan dollars.59 
B. The Clawback’s Impact 
The reality of the mandated switch is that the federal government took 
administrative control of the new drug benefit for dually eligible beneficiaries 
while leaving the states with the burden of paying for the drugs.  The MMA 
clawback is an unprecedented funding mechanism that requires states to 
perpetually pay the bulk of dually eligibles’ drug costs.60  The amount of 
 
 54. Cody, supra note 2, at 27. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. (estimating that 7.5 million Medicaid beneficiaries are dually eligible and account 
for 40% of all Medicaid spending); see also Rehab. Ass’n. of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 
1444, 1447 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The Medicaid and Medicare statutes intersect for coverage of 
the population of the disabled or people 65 or over (eligible for Medicare) who are also poor 
(eligible for Medicaid).  These people are called dual eligibles or crossovers.”); Channick, 
supra note 18, at 245 (discussing mandatory enrollment for dual eligibles); Huberfeld, supra 
note 45 (describing mandatory enrollment for dual eligibles). 
 57. Channick, supra note 18, at 245. 
 58. See Huberfeld, supra note 45 (describing the clawback). 
 59. See Channick, supra note 18, at 243 n.28 (discussing the administration’s beliefs 
about involving private insurers in Medicare); see also KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE 
UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., DUAL ELIGIBLES: MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR LOW-
INCOME MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (July 2005), available at www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/ 
4091-04%20final(v2).pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (discussing the number of dual eligibles 
and why Medicare beneficiaries need Medicaid). 
 60. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 136 (describing the “clawback” and 
suggesting that a “major source of financing for the new plan is ‘clawback’ payments imposed 
on the states by the MMA”). 
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each state’s contribution to the federal benefit is based on states’ historical 
spending on Medicaid prescription drugs.61 
In eleventh-hour amendments to the MMA, intended to address the Part 
D budget overrun,62 Congress required states to pay 90% of dually eligible 
beneficiaries’ drug costs in 2006, the program’s first year.63  The state 
contribution “phases down” to 75% for the year 2015 and will remain at 
that level permanently.64  While states’ primary fiscal responsibility for drug 
costs phases down, it never phases out.  Furthermore, despite their funding 
responsibility, states have no administrative control over the federal 
prescription drug formulary, Medicare eligibility, clawback calculation and 
assessment, or any other aspect of Medicare program administration.65  In 
addition, the MMA provides no method for states to review, appeal, or 
object to the clawback amount.  If states fail or refuse to pay, the MMA 
authorizes the payment due to be extracted through an automatic offset 
against federal Medicaid funds to which states are otherwise are entitled.66  
The automatic offset effectively means that states cannot choose whether to 
participate in the cooperative funding approach to Part D.  The clawback 
operates as a mandatory, permanent excise on states to support a federal 
public benefits program. 
III.  THE STATES’ CHALLENGE 
Concerned about the potentially enormous budgetary impact of the 
clawback and its distortion of state and federal powers, several states sought 
 
 61. Id.; see also Cody, supra note 2, at 28 (some states estimated that they would pay 
more under the Part D clawback than historical Medicaid drug costs); Channick, supra note 
18, at 275 (noting that CBO estimated states’ contribution toward MMA in the first five years 
at $50 billion, or 13% of program costs). 
 62. The Bush Administration promised that Part D could be enacted for $400 billion. In 
2005, the White House released budget figures estimating that Part D will cost more than 
$1.2 trillion in the next decade.  Ceci Connolly & Mike Allen, Medicare Drug Benefit May 
Cost $1.2 Trillion; Estimate Dwarfs Bush's Original Price Tag, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2005, at  
A1; see also Channick, supra note 18, at 238 (noting that Senator Edward Kennedy “freely 
admitted that the $400 billion is merely a down payment on the cost of providing a 
prescription drug benefit to Medicare beneficiaries”); Dodge, supra note 51 (noting that many 
healthcare analysts “questioned whether the $400 billion for prescription drugs and free-
market forces would be enough, predicting Congress would have to find other ways to contain 
Medicare costs”). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(5) (Supp. IV 2004); see also Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, 
at 136 (discussing the initial and future percentages of costs that states are responsible for 
under the clawback). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(5). 
 65. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 140. 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004). 
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to have the clawback struck down on constitutional grounds.67  Given the 
utter unpredictability of the payment demand, with first payments coming 
due in October 2006 and no means to appeal the amount demanded, the 
five Petitioner States—Texas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, and New Jersey—
decided to seek immediate review of the clawback in the U.S. Supreme 
Court.68  Several other states—Arizona, Alaska, Connecticut, Kansas, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and 
Vermont—filed a supporting amicus brief,69 essentially reiterating the 
Petitioner States’ arguments. 
A. Original Jurisdiction 
The States’ Petition presented one jurisdictional and three substantive 
arguments.  As a threshold matter, the States had to establish grounds for 
the Court to exercise original jurisdiction, an exceptional practice by the 
Court70 and arguably strategic error by a petitioner.  But the States’ stakes 
were utterly unpredictable and potentially staggering.  The clawback 
formula, its calculation, and payment demand are completely within federal 
control and the statute provides no method of appeal or challenge to the 
payment demand.  Accordingly, it seemed imperative to leapfrog lower 
court litigation and challenge the clawback definitively in the Supreme Court 
before the first payments were calculated and due on October 15, 2006. 
The two grounds for Supreme Court original jurisdiction that the States 
had to establish were the “seriousness and dignity” of the States’ interest71 
and the lack of an adequate alternative forum.72  The States argued that the 
clawback raises serious constitutional questions regarding federal intrusion 
into essential state functions, namely, the budgetary process.73  They urged 
 
 67. Channick, supra note 18, at 276-77 (describing States’ litigation); Cauchi, supra 
note 45, at 30 (quoting Wyoming State Senator Charles Scott, “Don’t underestimate the 
degree of resentment that the ‘clawback’ has wrought.  It’s wide and it’s deep, and I think it’s 
going to cause widespread litigation.”); Huberfeld, supra note 45, at 483–86 (describing 
States’ litigation and summarizing arguments). 
 68. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 20-27. 
 69. Brief of the States of Arizona, Alaska, Connecticut, Kansas, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Vermont as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs, Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S.Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.) (No. 135)  [hereinafter States’ 
Amicus Brief]. 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see, e.g., South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 370, 382 
(1984) (exercising original jurisdiction to review constitutionality of Internal Revenue Code 
provision limiting exemption for interest earned on some state bonds). 
 71. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); see also Mississippi v. 
Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992). 
 72. United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973); see also Mississippi, 506 U.S. 
at 77. 
 73. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 11-14. 
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that the clawback could impose a staggering budgetary impact on states 
and the statute provides no way to appeal the payment demand.74  
Furthermore, no adequate alternative forum existed that could provide 
timely, final resolution of the issue, especially because the clawback was 
already in operation and payments were quickly coming due.75 
B. Substantive Arguments 
In addition to the jurisdictional argument, the States presented three 
constitutional grounds for striking down the clawback: violation of 
intergovernmental tax immunity, violation of state sovereignty by 
commandeering state regulatory powers for federal functions, and violation 
of the Guarantee Clause.  Essentially, each of the constitutional claims is 
grounded in federalism and the Framers’ structural protections to prevent 
the federal government from encroaching on state sovereignty. 
1. Intergovernmental Tax Immunity 
The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine provides that the federal 
government cannot tax states qua states.76  For this argument, the States 
relied on New York v. United States,77 involving a state’s challenge to a 
federal tax on sales of spring water.  The rationale for the intergovernmental 
tax immunity doctrine is that requiring states to pay taxes to the federal 
government interferes with a core state function and state sovereignty.78  Just 
as the federal government cannot tax states, states cannot tax 
instrumentalities of the federal government.79  The doctrine derives from 
McCulloch v. Maryland, which famously recognized that “the power to tax 
involves the power to destroy.”80  Applying this doctrine to the clawback, the 
Petitioner States argued that setting state budgets is a core state function 
that is violated by requiring states to remit an undeterminable amount to the 
federal government each year.81  In New York, the Court ruled that 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 21, 23-25. 
 76. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 521 (1926) (“[T]he very nature of our 
constitutional system of dual sovereign governments is such as impliedly to prohibit the federal 
government from taxing the instrumentalities of a state government . . . .”). 
 77. 326 U.S. 572 (1946). 
 78. Id. at 586-87; see also Metcalf & Eddy, 269 U.S. at 523. 
 79. Metcalf & Eddy, 269 U.S. at 521. 
 80. 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) (prohibiting the State of Maryland from taxing a branch of 
the Bank of the United States); see also Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 127 (1870) 
(recognizing that states should enjoy the same immunity from federal taxation that federal 
government enjoys from state taxation), overruled on other grounds by Graves v. New York ex 
rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). 
 81. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 12, 21. 
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intergovernmental tax immunity did not apply because the tax was imposed 
on the state acting in proprietary capacity, like any other merchant selling 
spring water.82  Although perhaps not resting entirely on the proprietary 
versus non-proprietary distinction, New York makes clear, at the very least, 
that the federal government may not tax a state as a state.83 
Here, the States argued the clawback does nothing more than impose a 
direct tax on states as states, thus it violates the intergovernmental tax 
immunity doctrine.84  Under the proprietary function distinction, it could 
hardly be suggested that states were operating as business entities in 
administering Medicaid programs and thus properly subject to federal 
taxation.85  Public benefits programs are core state functions, not proprietary 
operations.  More particularly, the clawback interferes with states’ ability to 
govern and leaves them no choice but to allocate a portion of their budgets 
to a federal program.86  Budget setting is a core state function that requires 
states to allocate necessarily scarce resources among a variety of programs 
and residents’ needs.87  The clawback interferes with state sovereignty by 
removing a substantial portion of the budget from states’ control and 
annually exposing them to an unpredictable federal tax, the amount of 
which could change without notice or opportunity for objection or review.  
The States noted that, as of their Supreme Court Petition filing date, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had already “sent up to 
three different notices to the States, repeatedly altering the clawback 
amounts the States must pay in 2006.”88 
The States argued that with the automatic offset penalty the clawback 
operates as a mandatory, unconditional tax, not a conditional offer of 
federal funds for Medicaid, thereby distinguishing this case from South 
Dakota v. Dole,89 which upheld a federal statute that conditioned receipt of 
 
 82. 326 U.S. at 581; see also Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (upholding 
federal license tax on sale of liquor where state had monopoly on sale of liquor), abrogated 
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Helvering v. Powers, 
293 U.S. 214 (1934) (upholding federal income tax as applied to employees of state-owned 
railway), abrogated by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 83. 326 U.S. at 582. 
 84. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 5, 21. 
 85. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1256 (8th ed. 2004) (defining proprietary function to be 
“[a] municipality’s conduct that is performed for the profit or benefit of the municipality, rather 
than for the benefit of the general public”).  See generally New York, 326 U.S. at 572 
(discussing the federal government’s ability to tax a state depending what capacity it is acting 
in). 
 86. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 136-38. 
 87. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 21. 
 88. Id. at 12 n.6. 
 89. 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987). 
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federal highway funds on states enacting a specified minimum drinking age.  
According to the States, the clawback does not require states to enact any 
laws or implement a particular regulatory regime.90  The States argued that 
nothing in the language of the clawback is conditional or optional.  Instead, 
the statute merely demands that states pay a specified amount of funds to 
the federal government.91  In order to extract the payment, the federal 
government can automatically offset the amount due against states’ Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP).92  Accordingly the States’ Brief 
characterized the clawback as a direct, unconstitutional tax on states, rather 
than a condition on receipt of federal funds.93  The States urged the Court 
to review the case to examine the present scope of the intergovernmental tax 
immunity doctrine, which has not been squarely addressed or clarified since 
New York in 1946. 
2. Anti-Commandeering 
The States’ anti-commandeering argument suggested that the clawback 
operates as the federal government’s attempt to commandeer state 
regulatory powers to carry out a federal program.94  Specifically, state 
appropriations powers and state budgetary mechanisms were enlisted to 
fund a federal program.95  The States relied on two key cases that prohibit 
the federal government from commandeering states.  First, in New York v. 
United States,96 federal legislation required states to regulate radioactive 
waste according to the federal scheme or, if they refused, to “take title” to 
producers’ low-level radioactive waste, including liability and disposal costs 
imposed by federal law.97  The Court held that giving states a choice 
between two unconstitutional choices was “no choice at all.”98  States were 
effectively compelled to enforce the federal regulations or face liability under 
them.  The legislation was struck down as being in violation of the anti-
commandeering principle.99  Similarly, in Printz v. United States,100 the 
federal Brady Handgun Act was held to commandeer state executive officials 
 
 90. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 14-16. 
 91. Id. at i, 2. 
 92. 42 U.S.C. §1396u-5(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 93. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 15 n.10 (arguing unconstitutional condition, in the 
alternative, because provision failed to give unambiguous notice of condition, thereby 
impairing states’ ability to knowingly accept or refuse conditions). 
 94. Id. at 18. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 97. Id. at 174-75. 
 98. Id. at 176. 
 99. Id. at 176, 188. 
 100. 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
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to perform background checks on gun purchasers.  States had no choice 
about carrying out the federal law enforcement function, so the Court struck 
that provision of the legislation.101 
The rationale for the anti-commandeering doctrine is that compelling 
state governments to enforce a federal regulatory scheme undermines 
political accountability.102  The federal government takes credit for enacting 
legislation, yet is shielded from constituents’ objections to the law’s 
implementation or enforcement.103  In the context of Part D, such tension is 
readily apparent.  The federal government took credit for radically 
expanding Medicare benefits but placed a substantial funding responsibility 
on states and insulated federal lawmakers from taxpayers’ complaints about 
the program’s price tag, which already far exceeded the administration’s 
estimates. 
3. Guarantee Clause 
The States’ third substantive argument came under the Guarantee 
Clause.  The Constitution guarantees to every state a republican form of 
government.104  This guarantee is violated if states cannot exercise their 
state powers and discretion.  The Court has consistently and repeatedly 
acknowledged the Guarantee Clause’s protection of state sovereignty and 
separate governance.105  The States argued that the clawback violates the 
Guarantee Clause by “hijacking the States’ budgetary processes.”106  The 
clawback effectively subjects states’ budgets to the discretion of federal 
authorities, namely HHS and CMS, by statutorily empowering them to 
command a substantial and unpredictable portion of state budgets. 
C. Professors’ Amicus Brief 
To buttress the States’ constitutional arguments and encourage the 
Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to review the clawback, 
two amici filed supporting briefs.  First, ten states that did not participate as 
petitioners filed a supporting brief, essentially restating the arguments 
 
 101. Id. at 935. 
 102. Id. at 930. 
 103. Id. 
 104. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 105. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999) (recognizing state’s right “to order 
the processes of its own governance”); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 761 (1982) (noting that “power to make decisions and to set policy” is central to 
state sovereignty); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868) (noting that each state is 
“endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence”). 
 106. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 20. 
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described above.107  Second, a group of health law professors and 
practitioners filed the Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Health Law as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs.108  Working with attorneys from the 
Texas Solicitor General’s office and Jackson Walker L.L.P. in Austin, Texas, I 
drafted and circulated the Professors’ Brief. 
The objective of the Professors’ Brief was not to reargue the substantive 
and jurisdictional grounds in the States’ Brief.  Instead, we aimed to suggest 
prudential or policy rationales for striking down the clawback and exercising 
original jurisdiction by providing the Court with a fuller description of the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs’ design and operation.  Our goal was to 
show that the clawback threatens both Congress’s initial design for the 
programs and beneficiaries’ access to essential healthcare.  Accordingly, we 
urged the Court to strike down the clawback by exercising original 
jurisdiction and not wait for the issue to percolate up from the lower courts. 
We asserted two main prudential arguments.  First, we demonstrated 
that the clawback arrangement for funding the cost of dually eligible 
beneficiaries’ drugs disrupts the design, structure, and guarantee of both the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs.109  Second, we identified particular flaws 
in the formula for calculating the clawback amount to highlight the 
unpredictable and potentially detrimental impact that the payment would 
have on states’ budgets and Medicaid operation.110 
1. Program Design and Operation 
Medicare has always been a fully federal program with uniform eligibility 
and benefits nationwide.111  By design, Medicare is distinctly not a welfare 
program.112  Any citizen with the requisite work history or disabling condition 
qualifies, without regard to income.113  With minor exceptions, implemented 
by the MMA, all beneficiaries receive the same level of benefits at the same 
price, even if they have other means or benefits at their disposal.114  Tied to 
Social Security benefits, which operate as a federal pension, Medicare is 
essentially a federal healthcare program for retired and disabled workers.115 
 
 107. See generally States’ Amicus Brief, supra note 69. 
 108. See generally Professors’ Brief, supra note 15. 
 109. Id. at 6-7. 
 110. Id. at 8-10. 
 111. Id. at 4; Rehab. Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1463 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 112. See Professors’ Brief, supra note 15, at 4 (pointing out that “[p]rogram eligibility is 
based on age or disability, rather than financial need”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. But see Jost, supra note 49 (discussing MMA’s addition of upper-level means-testing 
for Part B and Part D drug benefit subsidies for low-income beneficiaries). 
 115. See Kinney, supra note 41, at 856 (noting that Medicare was based on a “social 
insurance model . . . financed through a separate wage tax, and bases eligibility on 
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Medicaid, by contrast, is a state welfare program for low-income 
residents.116  Eligibility traditionally was tied to eligibility for the state welfare 
programs (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and, later, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)).117  The federal 
government established Medicaid but left states to implement and operate 
the program according to their own designs.  Medicaid is a traditional 
“conditional funding” program—states that choose to participate in the 
program must comply with broad federal requirements in order to receive 
federal funding support.118 
The clawback alters the fundamental design of both the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs.  Medicare is no longer a fully federal program because 
a substantial portion of the Part D benefit is funded directly by state 
budgets.119  Medicaid is no longer a voluntary, conditional funding 
program.  States must remit the clawback amount or suffer automatic loss of 
otherwise due FMAP.120  Another way of viewing the clawback, not argued 
in the States’ Petition, is that it operates as a new, burdensome condition on 
Medicaid participation, of which states had no notice and no opportunity to 
decline.  Under both views, the clawback fundamentally alters Medicaid’s 
cooperative state-federal design.  
Medicaid was included in the same legislation that created Social 
Security, the federal pension program, and Medicare.121  Unlike Medicare, 
which is fully federal, Medicaid is a “cooperative endeavor in which the 
Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to 
 
beneficiary contributions during working years”); see also Robert F. Rich & William D. White, 
Federalism and Health Care Policy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 861, 872 (1998) (“With the 
enactment of Medicare in 1965, the federal government assumed responsibility for acute care 
of the elderly.”). 
 116. See Kinney, supra note 41, at 856 (“Congress adopted the welfare model for the 
Medicaid program’s basic design.”). 
 117. Id. at 864; see also Bowen Garrett & John Holahan, Health Insurance Coverage After 
Welfare, 19 HEALTH AFF. 175, 175 (2000). 
 118. See Kinney, supra note 41, at 856 (noting that “Medicaid is jointly . . . financed by 
state and federal general revenues, and bases eligibility on a means test.”); Rich & White, 
supra note 115 (noting that Medicaid was enacted at the same time as Medicare, “as a 
partnership with the states.  The program provided resources for cost sharing to induce states 
to participate,” with a “range of voluntary options” but “terms of participation were 
determined in Washington.”); Rosenbaum, supra note 42, at 10 (“Medicaid followed the 
tradition of federal grant-in-aid programs, enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending clause 
powers, which condition the receipt of federal funds by states that elect to participate on 
compliance with a series of structural and operational conditions of participation.”). 
 119. See Channick, supra note 18, at 245-46. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 121. See Rosenbaum, supra note 42, at 8-9. 
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aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons.”122  Medicaid is a true 
welfare program in that eligibility is based on financial need, rather than 
age or disability.123  Financial contribution by both the states and the federal 
government is the “cornerstone of Medicaid.”124  Medicaid participation is 
voluntary, but once a state chooses to participate, it must administer its 
program in a manner consistent with the Medicaid Act’s requirements.125  
Participating states must submit plans to federal authorities for approval.126  
Each state’s plan must meet statutory requirements, including covering 
broad categories of mandatory services and serving “categorically needy” 
and certain “medically needy” beneficiaries.127  States’ Medicaid plans may 
also extend optional benefits to other categories of beneficiaries and 
services.128  Prescription drugs are one such optional benefit.129 
Within the broad federal requirements, states have considerable 
discretion over coverage, eligibility, enrollment, and administration of their 
own Medicaid programs.130  Each state receives federal matching dollars on 
a percentage basis for all money its Medicaid program spends on both 
required and optional services.  The FMAP, which ranges from 50% to 83%, 
is based on the state’s relative wealth, with the poorest states receiving the 
highest matching percentage.131  The matching grants are intended to 
create an incentive for states to spend generously on their state Medicaid 
plans by offering federal support for each dollar spent.132  The FMAP applies 
 
 122. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980); see also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 
U.S. 879, 883 (1988). 
 123. Individuals who are both poor and either disabled or elderly qualify for both Medicaid 
and Medicare and, thus, are termed dual-eligibles. See Rehab. Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 
F.3d 1444, 1463-64 (4th Cir. 1994) (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(providing overview of both programs and dual-eligibles). 
 124. McRae, 448 U.S. at 308. 
 125. See 42 U.S.C § 1396a(b) (2000); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 
(1990); McRae, 448 U.S. at 301-02. 
 126. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2007); Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. at 502. 
 127. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A). 
 128. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; 42 C.F.R. § 440 (2007). 
 129. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(12) (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.120(a) (listing prescribed 
drugs), 440.225 (designating optional services). 
 130. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 883 (1988) (noting that, “[s]ubject to the 
federal standards . . . , each participating State must develop its own program describing 
conditions of eligibility and covered services”). 
 131. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b, 1396d(b) (defining “federal medical assistance 
percentage” (FMAP)); 42 C.F.R. §§ 433.10 (rates of federal financial participation (FFP)), 
434.70 (2007) (conditions for FFP). 
 132. See Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 479-82 (1938) 
(introducing symposium on “cooperative federalism” and describing various programs under 
which Congress provided grants to states to encourage them to expand their activity).  But see 
Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and Health Care Reform, 
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equally to beneficiaries and services that federal legislation requires states to 
cover as well as expanded categories of beneficiaries and optional benefits, 
including prescription drug coverage.133 
Because states may choose not to participate in conditional funding 
programs, cases involving such programs are distinguishable from the 
commandeering cases cited in the Petitioner States’ Brief.  The Court has 
held that the federal government may constitutionally exercise its spending 
power to enact legislation that creates incentives for state regulatory 
programs, i.e., place conditions on federal funds to support them, as long 
as the encouragement does not end up commandeering.134 
Medicaid fits the conditional funding model, as the Court has repeatedly 
recognized.135  States are free to opt out of Medicaid and set up their own 
state health or welfare plans or provide nothing at all, but they will not 
receive federal funding.  States that choose to participate but fail to comply 
with federal requirements may be denied federal financial assistance or 
disqualified from participation in the Medicaid program.136  The clawback 
and automatic offset penalty alter this model significantly.  States now face a 
new, unexpected condition on Medicaid participation.  If they fail to comply 
with the mandatory clawback, they lose FMAP dollars otherwise due.137  
Given the unpredictable budgetary impact of the clawback, especially in the 
first year of the new Part D benefit, there may be states that simply cannot 
afford the demand under current budgets.  Perversely, the poorest states 
stand to lose the most under the clawback offset because the federal 
matching percentage is based on the states’ relative wealth.138  Since its 
enactment, the Medicaid program has made great strides in improving 
 
28 CONN. L. REV. 115, 120 (1995) (suggesting that dollar-for-dollar matching grants, instead 
of block grants, give states an improper incentive to “create ‘luxury’ health insurance 
programs”). 
 133. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID PROGRAM–GENERAL INFORMATION, 
TECHNICAL SUMMARY, at http://cms.hhs.gov/medicaidGeninfo/03_TechnicalSummary.asp (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
 134. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1987) (federal legislation that 
conditioned highway funds on states’ implementation of a minimum drinking age of twenty-
one did not violate spending power, as states could freely opt out).  Several states, notably, 
Louisiana, for many years turned down the offer of highway funds and tolerated the potholes, 
recognizing a better fiscal benefit in tourism income from younger drinkers. 
 135. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (characterizing Medicaid as a 
cooperative endeavor by which federal government created incentive for states to provide 
healthcare to poor residents by offering federal financial assistance). 
 136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2000). 
 137. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 138. See 42 C.F.R. § 433.10(b) (2007). 
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healthcare access for low-income and medically vulnerable individuals.139  
Accordingly, the clawback and automatic offset penalty undermine the very 
essence of the Medicaid program.   
2. The Clawback Formula 
The second line of argument in the Professors’ Brief highlighted flaws in 
the clawback formula’s operation.  The formula for calculating states’ 
clawback payment is specified in the MMA statute and detailed in HHS 
implementing regulations.140  The formula itself is not constitutionally 
objectionable or grounds for striking down the clawback.  But we hoped to 
support the States’ substantive arguments and enhance the Court’s 
understanding of the budgetary impact, violation of state sovereignty, and 
threat to beneficiaries’ healthcare by explaining the inherent flaws and 
unfairness in the formula and its unusual legislative history. 
The MMA requires states to make monthly payments to federal 
authorities, calculated annually as the states’ historical spending on 
prescription drugs in the base year (2003) multiplied by the number of dual 
eligibles in the current year, multiplied by the “phased down state 
contribution,” which begins at 90% in year 1 (2006) and phases down to 
75% in year 2015 and thereafter.141  Thus, the formula has three 
components: (1) State per capita expenditures for prescription drug 
coverage for dual-eligibles; (2) the number of enrolled dual-eligibles; and 
(3) phased-down percentage, as specified in the Act.142  We demonstrated 
flaws with each element of the formula. 
(a) Using 2003 as the Base Year 
First, the historical spending and 2003 base year permanently insert 
unfairness and anomalies into the formula.  The figure is the amount that 
the state spent, per capita, on dual eligibles’ Medicaid prescription drug 
costs in 2003.143  The base-year amount is trended forward, based on an 
inflation factor and other adjustments that the HHS Secretary exclusively 
controls.144  The problem with the base year is that it may reflect a one-time 
 
 139. See Marc L. Berk & Claudia L. Schur, Access to Care:  How Much Difference Does 
Medicaid Make?, 17 HEALTH AFF. 169, 170, 176-78 (1998). 
 140. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 423.908, 423.910 (2007). 
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5; see also Implementation of the New Medicare Drug Benefit: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 34 (2006) (testimony of Mark B. 
McClellan, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) (explaining that the 
clawback was intended “to account for a portion of the costs that states had previously paid 
for Medicare beneficiaries who are also in Medicaid”). 
 142. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 423.10. 
 143. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(3)(A). 
 144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(3)(B). 
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aberration in state Medicaid drug spending in year 2003.  For example, 
states may have temporarily expanded drug spending in that year or 
subsequently implemented successful cost-containment strategies that would 
never be captured in the clawback formula.145  In addition, states are 
perpetually denied the fiscal benefit of recent reforms to improve Medicaid 
efficiency or contain costs during the time that they bore full responsibility for 
prescription drug coverage.  Meanwhile, the federal government garners a 
windfall to the extent that states reduced Medicaid spending after 2003 until 
Part D was implemented. 
Moreover, the base-year figure penalizes states that were historically 
more generous.  Prescription drug coverage is an optional service under 
Medicaid that all states were providing when the MMA was enacted.146  As 
an optional benefit, states had full discretion over the scope of coverage 
provided.  But now, states that historically provided more generous 
coverage than other states perpetually will be required to pick up a larger 
share of the federal tab for Medicare Part D, without regard to their relative 
wealth, financial resources, Medicaid enrollment, or current Medicaid 
spending.  States that provided generously in 2003 but were forced to cut 
benefits due to budgetary or other pressures will be on the hook 
continuously for the higher spending amount.  In other words, the clawback 
translates states’ past generous spending on state Medicaid programs into 
mandatory generous support for a federal program. 
The inflation factor is also problematic because it is based not on state-
specific drug costs reflected in states’ individualized Medicaid drug 
formularies.  Starting from each state’s 2003 base-year spending level, the 
amount is trended forward, theoretically to reflect rising prescription drug 
costs over time.147  Recall that prescription drug coverage is optional under 
Medicaid; accordingly, states may vary widely in the variety and number of 
 
 145. Forty-six out of fifty states implemented some type of Medicaid pharmacy cost-savings 
reforms during 2003; forty-four took action in 2004, but these efforts will not be reflected in 
the amount states are required to pay to the federal government. APRIL GRADY & CHRISTINE 
SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMPLICATIONS OF THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT FOR 
STATE BUDGETS CRS-3 n.4 (2004) (citing VERNON SMITH ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., STATES RESPOND TO FISCAL PRESSURE: STATE MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH AND COST 
CONTAINMENT IN FISCAL YEARS 2003 AND 2004, RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE SURVEY apps. B-E, 
available at http://kff.org/medicaid/upload/States-Respond-to-Fiscal-Pressure-State-Medicaid 
-Spending-Growth-and-Cost-Containment.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2007)). 
 146. Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 118. 
 147. See 42 U.S.C § 1396u-5(c)(2)(A)(ii); 42 C.F.R. § 423.902 (2007) (defining 
“[a]pplicable growth factor,” based on “National Total Drug National Health Expenditure 
projections” for 2004-2006). 
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drugs they choose to cover.148  The clawback base year is trended forward 
for inflation, however, based on nationwide per capita drug costs under all 
formularies.149  Various factors (e.g., regional practice preferences and 
marketing, drug plan formularies, relative bargaining strength and price 
negotiations, cost-containment laws and incentives) could produce 
differences in prescription drug costs increases across states and regions.150  
The amounts that private insurers’ prescription drug coverage or patients’ 
out-of-pocket spending on prescription drugs differ from and exceed states’ 
Medicaid spending levels will be inserted into the clawback formula, 
inflating the amount that states are required to pay to the federal program.  
Beginning in 2007, the growth factor will be tied to Medicare Part D 
spending.151  Like the 2003 base year, the nationwide inflation factor could 
result in grossly inaccurate estimates of states’ actual drug spending. 
(b) Dually Eligible Beneficiary Enrollment 
We also pointed out that using the current-year dually eligible 
beneficiary enrollment factor is problematic because states are largely at the 
mercy of the federal government’s efforts to increase enrollment in the new 
Part D program.  Part D was designed to promote quality and contain costs 
by relying on competitive market incentives, with private insurers offering 
competing drug plans that beneficiaries could select among based on ease 
of enrollment, premiums, deductibles, service, coverage, quality, and other 
factors.152  The success of the competitive model depended on the federal 
government’s ability to create a sufficiently large market demand for drug 
plans so that multiple insurers would choose to enter the market.153  
Requiring dual eligibles to enroll in Part D plans, instead of state Medicaid 
drug plans, was one approach to increasing the customer base.154  In 
addition, the availability of the new Medicare drug benefit and the federal 
government’s promotion efforts were expected to create an incentive for 
previously unenrolled but eligible Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in the 
 
 148. See supra notes 125-135 and accompanying text (describing Medicaid conditional 
funding and optional services). 
 149. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(2)(A);  42 C.F.R. §§ 423.902, 423.910(b) (defining 
elements of formula). 
 150. See GRADY & SCOTT, supra note 145, at CRS-3.  But see Medicare Program; 
Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70 Fed. Reg. 4194, 4422 (Jan. 28, 2005) (declining to 
adopt state-specific inflation factors because that approach would be “imprecise and would 
introduce new reporting requirements”). 
 151. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(4). 
 152. See Channick, supra note 18, at 267-69. 
 153. Id. at 269-70. 
 154. See Cody, supra note 2. 
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program.155  Many new enrollees might discover, in the sign-up process, 
that they also qualified for state Medicaid benefits.  The so-called woodwork 
effect could dramatically increase dual-eligible enrollment, escalating states’ 
direct Medicaid costs and clawback liability over time.156 
We certainly did not argue that encouraging unenrolled, eligible 
beneficiaries to sign up for Medicare and Medicaid was an undesirable, 
much less unconstitutional, feature of Part D implementation.  But we did 
want to point out that the new Part D’s attraction and federal efforts to 
“shake the trees” could dramatically increase state Medicaid rolls and, 
thereby, state funding pressures, with little room for states to contain the 
costs of increased enrollment.  States that cannot balance the clawback’s 
added costs and dual-eligible rolls may be forced to discontinue or limit 
certain optional eligibility categories or more rigorously screen enrollment 
applications to maintain existing rolls.  One way states could contain budget 
pressures would be to restrict eligibility, for example, by raising the income 
level or other substantive requirements, to the extent states have discretion 
under the federal Medicaid statute.157  Another approach would be to 
restrict coverage or benefits under state Medicaid plans, again, to the extent 
the federal requirements allow.158 
However, both approaches are problematic.  First, restricting enrollment 
and eliminating previously covered services threatens beneficiaries’ 
entitlement to Medicaid and potentially exposes states to Section 1983 
litigation for violating beneficiaries’ due process or other constitutional 
rights.159  Aside from potential constitutional challenges, a policy problem 
 
 155. Professors’ Brief, supra note 15, at 15. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 3, 9-10. 
 158. See Cody, supra note 2, at 29 (highlighting adverse incentives on states to decrease 
enrollment and services as result of clawback, and noting that “[s]everal states . . . have 
recently announced plans to reduce or eliminate Medicaid coverage for certain individuals, 
including dual eligibles”); Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 136 (noting that “[s]tates will 
also face tough choices in deciding how generous to be in supplementing Medicare’s limited 
national coverage” and “fear that decisions to extend supplemental benefits will doom them to 
having to subsidize coverage in perpetuity if the national government ever decides to expand 
its own benefits”). 
 159. See Professors’ Brief, supra note 15, at 7-10 (noting that restricting eligibility or 
limiting services could run awry of Medicaid enrollees’ entitlement to a certain level of medical 
care to which they have become accustomed.  Therefore, states that choose these cost 
containment strategies risk constitutional challenges from program beneficiaries); Pediatric 
Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2006); 
Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 719 (11th  Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs had a “federal 
right to . . . prompt provision of assistance under . . . the Medicaid Act, and that this right is 
enforceable under section 1983”); see also Barker, supra note 18, at 65-67 (discussing cases 
asserting enforceable entitlement to Medicaid benefits); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 39, at 
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exists with incentivizing states to decrease enrollment, coverage, or services.  
This incentive directly opposes FMAP’s intended incentive for states to spend 
generously on their Medicaid programs.  As one court eloquently noted in 
considering beneficiaries’ Section 1983 challenge, underlying the 
statistics, acronyms of agencies and bureaucratic entities, Supreme Court 
case names and quotes, official governmental reports, periodicity tables, 
etc. . . . let there be no forgetting the real people to whom this dry and 
bloodless language gives voice: anxious, working parents who are too poor 
to obtain medications  . . . for their children, AIDs patients unable to get 
treatment, [and] elderly persons suffering from chronic conditions like 
diabetes and heart disease . . . .160 
But if states opt to extend Medicaid eligibility, the clawback works against 
the expansion by adding costs, directly opposing the intention of open-
ended federal matching dollars to encourage broader state spending.161 
The second component of the formula, counting the number of dual-
eligible Medicare Part D enrollees during the month in question, also leaves 
states at the mercy of federal authorities who have full control and discretion 
over Medicare enrollment.162  Unlike with Medicaid, under which states 
have broad discretion, states have no authority or control over the Medicare 
enrollment or coverage.  For example, if Congress statutorily expands 
Medicare eligibility, or CMS or other federal authorities ease the Medicare 
enrollment or application process, states could face corresponding increases 
in dual-eligible Medicaid enrollment and, accordingly, their clawback 
obligations. 
Furthermore, “the new Part D benefit could have a ‘woodwork’ effect of 
encouraging previously unenrolled [but eligible] individuals to sign-up for 
government health insurance” programs.163  Federal enrollment and 
screening procedures may identify individuals as dually eligible and assist 
them with referral to and applying for appropriate state Medicaid programs.  
Much of the touted savings that states anticipate with the federal 
government assuming the prescription drug costs could largely be lost to 
increased dual-eligible enrollment.164 
 
7-8 (describing Medicaid’s “three entitlements” to states, providers, and beneficiaries).  But 
see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement, 22 HEALTH AFF. 
145, 147-48 (2003) (characterizing Medicaid as a “weak entitlement”). 
 160. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 281 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 161. See S. REP. NO. 89-404 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1934, 1951. 
 162. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 163. Professors’ Brief, supra note 15, at 15. 
 164. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 4954–MEDICARE MODERNIZATION 
AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG ACT OF 2002, at 1, 13 (2002) (as ordered reported by the House 
Committee on Ways and Means) (reducing CBO’s initial fifty eight billion dollar estimate of 
savings to states for the period of 2003-2012, to approximately twelve billion dollars, after 
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Congress and the courts have previously recognized that changing 
federal Medicare eligibility could increase Medicaid rolls and place financial 
pressures on the states.165  To ease the pressure and prevent states from 
opting out of Medicaid, Congress gave states alternative implementation 
options.  For example, when Congress added the federal Supplemental 
Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI) program, it also 
declared that all SSI recipients were entitled to Medicaid.166  Accordingly, 
the SSI amendment “threatened to swell the Medicaid rolls and place a 
large and immediate fiscal burden on participating states.”167  Congress 
worried that “states would withdraw from the cooperative Medicaid program 
rather than expand their Medicaid coverage” proportional to the expanded 
federal benefit.168  Therefore, Congress gave states an alternative, the “§ 
209(b) option,” to automatically enrolling new SSI recipients in their 
Medicaid plans.  Fifteen states opted to be “§ 209(b) states.”169  No 
comparable safety valve or option exists in Part D to help states absorb the 
“woodwork” effect and increased enrollment resulting from the Part D 
Medicare expansion.  Thus, the possibility of states withdrawing from the 
Medicaid program under Part D pressures, thereby undermining an essential 
element of the welfare safety net, remains a very real possibility. 
(c) The Phased-Down Percentage 
The clawback formula’s third element is the phased-down state 
percentage, beginning at 90% state funding in 2006 and phasing down to 
75% state funding in 2015 and thereafter.170  Again, it is important to 
emphasize that the states’ percentage phases down but never out 
completely.  States perpetually will pay for three-quarters of the cost of a 
federal benefit for dual eligibles’ prescription drugs.  The legislative history 
of the clawback reveals its true intention. 
 
offsets accounting for increased spending on new dual-eligible enrollees and other factors); 
GRADY & SCOTT, supra note 145, at CRS 4-5 (noting potential increase in total state 
expenditures if Part D screening process identifies additional Medicaid-eligible individuals). 
 165. See, e.g., Winter v. Miller, 676 F.2d 276, 278 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that “raising 
benefits and lowering eligibility criteria” for Medicaid could “place a large and immediate 
fiscal burden on participating states”). 
 166. Id. at 277-78; Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 38 (1981). 
 167. Winter, 676 F.2d at 278 (describing changes). 
 168. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 38 (describing the program); see also Cohen v. Quern, 
608 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (N.D. Ill. 1984).  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (2000) 
(describing states’ duty to provide medical assistance to SSI recipients).   
 169. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 39-40, 40 n.6; Winter, 676 F.2d at 278. 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(5)(A) – (J) (Supp. IV 2004). 
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The clawback was an eleventh-hour addition to the MMA, inserted in an 
attempt to address Part D’s significant budget overrun.171  The clawback did 
not appear in either the House or Senate bill.  Neither bill required dual 
eligibles to switch drug coverage from state Medicaid plans to the to new 
Medicare benefit.  The Senate bill, in fact, required dual eligibles to 
continue receiving their prescription drug coverage through state Medicaid 
plans.172  The House bill gave these beneficiaries the option to enroll in Part 
D and remain enrolled in the Medicaid drug plan; Part D would be primary 
and Medicaid would be “wrap around” coverage.173  Under the House 
version, states would temporarily contribute to the federal benefit for dual 
enrollees, but the payment obligation phased out over time.174 
The Bush administration, touting the new, expanded Medicare program, 
affixed a $400 billion price tag to the Part D benefit.175  It quickly became 
clear that $400 billion was a gross underestimation.176  Attempting to 
address the cost overrun, the Conference Committee added three offsets.  
First, beneficiaries were required to pay monthly premiums for Part D 
coverage.177  Second, the Committee factored in the federal savings from 
the FMAP amount no longer due to states for drug costs.178  That is, the 
federal government would no longer have to pay matching dollars to states 
for dual eligibles’ Medicaid drug plans because those beneficiaries would 
be enrolled in Part D.  Third, the Committee added the clawback, 
permanently requiring states to shoulder a portion of the federal budget for 
 
 171. See Channick, supra note 18, at 274 (discussing the clawback provision’s costs to the 
states); Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 133-34 (describing the tumultuous legislative 
history of the MMA, including an “unprecedented nearly three-hour vote count delay while 
party leaders twisted arms,” and the clawback enactment). 
 172. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE FOR MEDICARE 
BENEFICIARIES:  A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF S. 1 AND H.R. 1, AND THE CONFERENCE 
AGREEMENT 5 (2003), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/Prescription-Drug-Coverage-
for-Medicare-Beneficiaries-A-Side-bySide-Comparison-of-S-1-and-H-R-1-and-teh-Conference 
-Agreement-H-R-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Connolly & Allen, supra note 62; Channick, supra note 18, at 238. 
 176. See Channick, supra note 18, at 238 (suggesting that Senator Edward Kennedy (D-
Mass.) “freely admitted that the $400 billion is merely a down payment on the cost of 
providing a prescription drug benefit to Medicare beneficiaries”); Dodge, supra note 51 
(noting that many healthcare analysts “questioned whether the $400 billion for prescription 
drugs and free-market forces would be enough, predicting Congress would have to find other 
ways to contain Medicare costs”). 
 177. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 172, at 3. 
 178. Id. at 5. 
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Part D.179  The clawback represents the largest offset, fixed as a permanent, 
primary funding source for the new Part D benefit.180 
Despite statutory language about the states’ “phased-down 
percentage,” suggesting that the federal government retains the primary 
obligation for the benefit, the Conference Committee report reveals the 
reality of the arrangement.  The committee notes speak in terms of “phased-
in” federal assumption of “administrative costs,” making clear that states 
have the primary funding obligation.181  Meanwhile, the federal government 
claims full credit for a generous and unprecedented expansion of 
Medicare.182  Moreover, the federal government retains full administrative 
control for the program at all times even though its responsibility for the so-
called administrative costs starts at only 10% and increases to a 25% 
maximum.  With their hands tied, states are unable to exercise any 
discretion over the Part D benefit, cost, or enrollment levels.183  They are 
required, however, to submit monthly payments, calculated by a formula 
wholly outside of their control, with no opportunity for review, challenge, or 
appeal. 
The House bill’s reference to administrative costs and federal phase-in 
inaccurately implies that states retain primary fiscal and administrative 
responsibility for the drug benefit.184  The federal government, in fact, 
retains full control over the new Part D program, including the authority to 
increase states’ clawback payments or demand additional state 
contributions through statutory revision if Medicare Part D expenditures 
 
 179. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at 509 (2003) (Conf. Rep.). 
 180. See GRADY & SCOTT, supra note 145, at CRS-1–2. 
 181. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at 509.  Even the initial House Report proposal would 
have phased-out state contribution (or “phased-in” 100% federal assumption of costs, in the 
proposal's terminology) by 2019, unlike the finally enacted version that requires states 
permanently to pay 75%.  See id. at 506, 509. 
 182.  OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y,  THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 (Dec. 8, 2003), at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031208-3.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) 
(announcing the MMA and touting that it will “help to create a modern Medicare system, 
allow for the biggest improvements in senior health care in nearly 40 years, and provide 
seniors with prescription drug benefits and more choices in health care” and that, “[f]or the 
first time in Medicare's history, a prescription drug benefit will be offered to all 40 million 
seniors and disabled Americans”); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism 
and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346-47 (1983) (describing previous conditional 
funding statutes and noting that “[s]uch legislation is relatively easy for Congress to pass 
because legislators can take credit for bold, new initiatives without having to face up to the 
problem of finding tax money to cover the costs of those programs”). 
 183.  For a discussion of accountability and federalism principles that are violated when 
states are forced to bear the expense of federal programs, see New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
 184. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at 506-07. 
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continue to overrun expectations.  The federal government claims full credit 
for expanding government healthcare benefits, while state authorities neither 
receive credit for funding nor retain control over the expansive program. 
D. The Outcome of the Petition 
Despite the States’ and Amici’s best efforts, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on June 19, 2006, inviting the States to pursue their claims in 
lower courts.185  This disposition was not entirely unexpected, given the 
infrequency of the Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction.  Perhaps the 
Petitioner States would have fared better had they pursued the litigation in 
district court and used the standard appellate process to request Supreme 
Court review if necessary.  At the time the Petition was filed, however, with 
the first unpredictable, possibly staggering clawback payments coming due, 
the extraordinary strategy seemed warranted. 
Somewhat surprisingly and despite the Court’s invitation, no state has 
brought clawback litigation in lower courts.  At least initially, the clawback’s 
budgetary impact on states turned out not to be as great as anticipated.186  
Most states broke even, compared to their previous Medicaid drug costs, 
and some came out ahead in the first year.187  Given various features of the 
clawback formula and the federal government’s complete control over its 
calculation and operation, there is no guarantee that states will avoid a 
future adverse budgetary impact.  But, for now, the Petitioner and Amici 
States appear to have directed their litigation and regulatory resources 
elsewhere. 
More importantly, the Supreme Court’s denial of review and states’ lack 
of follow-up in lower courts leaves the constitutionality of the clawback still 
very much an open question.  Funding a fully federal program with a 
permanent excise against states is an unprecedented and troubling 
innovation in the federalist system.  It runs awry of traditional notions of the 
constitutional allocation of power between the federal and state 
governments.  With the recent attention on healthcare reform at both federal 
and state levels, especially the attempt to identify strategies to defray the 
 
 185. Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S.Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.). 
 186. VERNON SMITH ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., LOW MEDICAID SPENDING 
GROWTH AMID REBOUNDING STATE REVENUES: RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET 
SURVEY STATE FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007, at 48-49 (2006), available at 
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7569-ES.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (compared to the 
expense of covering drugs for dual eligibles through Medicaid, fifteen states reported their FY 
2007 clawback obligation cost more, while fifteen states reported that it actually cost less.  
Twenty states reported little to no change.) 
 187.  Id. 
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ever-increasing costs,188 this unique funding arrangement warrants closer 
scrutiny. 
Accordingly, this Article examines some of the constitutional objections 
that the Court declined to consider, focusing particularly on the federalism 
grounds.  I conclude that the clawback should not survive a constitutional 
challenge because it effectively commandeers state regulatory authority to 
carry out a federal program.  Alternatively, the clawback operates as a new, 
retroactive condition on state’s voluntary Medicaid participation, exceeding 
the federal government’s spending power to enact conditional funding 
programs. 
IV.  FEDERALISM “TURF WAR” 
The allocation of power and responsibility between the federal 
government and the states is constitutionally grounded and was part of the 
Framers’ design to facilitate centralized coordination at the federal level, on 
the one hand, and diffusion of power and respect for state sovereignty, on 
the other.189  Federal powers are enumerated in the Constitution, including 
the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, the commerce power, 
national security powers, and the catch-all Necessary and Proper Clause.190  
Most health and welfare legislation at the federal level is enacted under the 
 
 188. See id. at 24.  For example, Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell recently introduced 
the “Prescription for Pennsylvania” plan.  Among the various factors expected to reduce the 
cost of healthcare, the proposal suggests incentivizing hospitals to reduce expensive 
emergency department procedures for non-emergency health problems, and stopping 
reimbursements to hospitals for unnecessary care in emergency departments.  State Watch: 
Pennsylvania Gov. Rendell Announces Proposal to Expand Health Care, Improve Quality, 
Reduce Costs, KAISER DAILY HEALTH POLICY REPORT, Jan. 19, 2007, at www.kaisernetwork.org/ 
daily_reports/print_report.cfm?DR_ID=42367&dr_cat=3 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); see 
also Governor’s Office of Health Care Reform, Prescription for Pennsylvania, at 
www.ohcr.state.pa.us/prescription-for-pennsylvania/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
 189.  See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (“It is incontestable that 
the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’”); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 
U.S. 505, 533 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny 
of small decisions—in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by 
bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell”, quoting Laurence Tribe, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 381 (2d. ed. 1988)); see also Hills, supra note 5, 
at 816 (“The national government has unique needs in maintaining the supremacy of federal 
law and an orderly federal system, yet there must be a limit to federal power and a 
corresponding reservoir of state power if federalism is to have any meaning at all.”); Rich & 
White, supra note 115, at 862 (noting historical tension between national and state 
governments and the “basic principle . . . of division of powers between distinct and co-
ordinate governments”). 
 190.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the federal powers). 
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spending or commerce powers.191  Spending power legislation must address 
matters of national concern and be for the benefit of the general welfare.192  
The Court has limited Congress’ ability to legislate social policy under the 
Commerce Clause to the extent that social problems may not sufficiently 
impact interstate commerce to justify use of that power.193  Spending power 
challenges to federal welfare legislation, by contrast, have been consistently 
rejected.194  Under the Supremacy Clause, if the federal government acts 
within its constitutionally enumerated powers, its laws are supreme and 
trump any contrary or inconsistent state laws.195 
Under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, all governmental 
powers not assigned to the federal government are reserved to the states.196  
 
 191.  See Carleton B. Chapman & John M. Talmadge, Historical and Political Background 
of Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 334, 336, 342 (1970). 
 192.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
 193. See Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next Generation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1629, 
1638-45 (2000).  (suggesting that “the Court made clear that the relationship between a 
regulated activity and interstate commerce must be substantial,” in his discussion of  United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and federal Gun-Free School Zones Act); see also 
Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Congressional Power Under 
the Commerce Clause?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 225 (1996) (listing examples of federal 
legislation enacted under Commerce Clause aimed at carjacking, arson, domestic violence, 
child support, and research animals); Melanie L. Winskie, Note, Can Federalism Save the 
Violence Against Women Act?, 31 GA. L. REV. 985, 1006-12 (1997) (citing cases and 
analyzing VAWA under Commerce Clause). 
 194. See Levy, supra note 193, at 1656-57, 1656 n.119 (citing lower court cases and 
discussing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)). 
 195.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation 
& Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983). 
 196. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) (noting that the 
states retained “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 
245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
156 (1992) (noting that the Constitution, “[b]eing an instrument of limited and enumerated 
powers, it follows irresistibly, that what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state 
authorities”) (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
3, at 752 (1833)); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 124 (1870) (overruled on other grounds) 
(quoting Tenth Amendment on reserved powers and noting that “[t]he government of the 
United States, therefore, can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, 
and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary 
implication”); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s 
Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 85 (“It is basic civics that the national government is 
one of delegated powers.  All powers not delegated are retained by the state governments.”). 
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Some of the most important powers reserved to the states are the “police 
powers” to protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens.197  Most state 
healthcare programs, including Medicaid, fall clearly within states’ broad 
police powers.  Federal authority limits state police powers only if the state 
action or law violates the U.S. Constitution or is preempted by federal 
enumerated powers.198  In addition, the federal government cannot require 
states to legislate according to Congress’s instructions.199  “[A]n essential 
attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty [is] that they remain independent 
and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.”200  The Framers’ 
express assignment of power to the federal government and reservation of 
all other powers to the states preserved broad state sovereignty.201  The 
challenge is defining the scope of the limited enumerated federal powers 
and broad reserved powers, especially when the two governments are 
attempting to regulate in the same area or coordinate regulatory 
responses.202 
A. Two Theoretical Views 
In this discussion, I suggest two theoretical approaches to the federalism 
turf war.  First, federalism may be viewed as a structural limit on respective 
federal and state powers that is hard-wired into the Constitution.  
Alternatively, federalism may be viewed as a contractual limit on the 
respective powers, allowing either side to freely agree to assign duties to or 
assume additional duties from the other. 
1. Structural Limit 
If federalism operates as a structural limit on respective federal and state 
powers, it would be impermissible for Congress to impose certain regulatory 
burdens on states, even if states agreed to them.203  The Framers are 
 
 197.  See Levy, supra note 193, at 1633 (noting that the “Tenth Amendment was 
interpreted as reserving the ‘police power’ to the states and federal legislation that usurped 
that power was invalid”). 
 198. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 199. New York, 505 U.S. at 162. 
 200.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 928. 
 201. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 288, 292-93(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 202.  New York, 505 U.S. at 155 (“[T]he task of ascertaining the constitutional line 
between federal and state power has given rise to many of the Court’s most difficult and 
celebrated cases.”). 
 203.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182 (“Where Congress exceeds its 
authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be 
ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”); Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 560 (1891) 
(“It does not admit of argument that congress can neither delegate its own powers, nor 
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assumed to have included structural limits in Constitution itself to avoid 
concentration of power in the federal government or dilution of coordinated, 
centralized power to the separate states.204  The structural view also may 
reflect the notion that states lack institutional competence in certain areas 
and, therefore, may not voluntarily assume those duties expressly 
enumerated as federal powers.205  As the Supreme Court noted, “Where 
Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, . . . the departure from 
the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state 
officials.”206 
An analogy in administrative law is the non-delegation doctrine which 
prohibits Congress from delegating certain functions and administrative 
agencies from making independent choices about what powers to 
assume.207  From a states’ rights perspective, the structural view undermines 
state autonomy.  States cannot agree to assume duties that are identified as 
 
enlarge those of a state.”); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1883) (federal 
government’s “sovereign attributes” cannot “be transferred to a state”). 
 204.  See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985) 
(noting that the “composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect 
the States from overreaching by Congress” and that “[s]tate sovereign interests, then, are more 
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system 
than by judicially created limitations on federal power”); see also McAllister, supra note 193, 
at 240-41 (describing values of federalism); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 89 
(“Federalism has allowed for national control over problems truly national in scope, while 
preserving participatory democracy at the local level of governance.”).  See generally Malcolm 
Wallop, The Centralization of Power and Governmental Unaccountability, 4 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 487 (1995) (bemoaning recent shift of power away from self-government toward 
central government). 
 205. See Hills, supra note 5, at 832-35 (providing support for view that Framers harbored 
“a deep distrust and disapproval of state officials”); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic 
Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 900 (1999) (suggesting 
that “American federalism was a pragmatic invention, a compromise designed to leave the 
states with primary responsibility for governing while granting the national government 
sufficient power to handle those aspects of government beyond the states’ institutional 
competence”). 
 206.  New York, 505 U.S. at 182. 
 207.  See  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 182 (citing Chadha and 
Buckley in discussion regarding structural limits on separation of powers into three branches of 
government); Hills, supra note 5, at 831-32 (suggesting non-delegation doctrine as analogy 
to nationalistic theory of state sovereignty); id. at 840-43 (describing Justice Story’s dissent in 
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), and opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), as suggesting a “nationalistic nondelegation theory” of state 
autonomy). 
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federal powers because it would exceed their competence and violate the 
Constitution.208 
2. Contractual Limit 
Under the alternative view of federalism as a contractual limit on power, 
the federal government can delegate even enumerated powers to states, 
and states can freely agree to a federal regulatory scheme or assume a 
burden.209  The delegation is limited only to the extent that states must be 
given clear notice of the terms and conditions so they can knowingly and 
voluntarily agree.210  Accordingly, the federal government will have to offer 
adequate incentives, typically money, to elicit the states’ agreement.211 
Consistent with the structural view, simple commandeering is still 
impermissible under the contractual view because it denies states the ability 
to opt in or out of assuming federal powers.212  One commentator 
described this view of federalism as assigning a “New York entitlement” to 
states, meaning that states hold the right to refuse participation in the 
federal program but can freely bargain away that entitlement if, given the 
terms and conditions of the offer, doing so is in their or their constituents’ 
interests.213  This view is similar to Coasian land use rules: no matter which 
 
 208.  See  Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 615-16 (1842) (concluding that federal 
government could not force state to enforce Fugitive Slave Clause, even if it wanted to do so 
because clause was found in federal Constitution); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 935 (1997) (holding that federal government cannot unconditionally force states to 
implement federal regulatory program). 
 209.  See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 210. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (superseded 
by statute) (statute must provide a clear expression of Congress's “intent to condition 
participation in the program[ ] . . . on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity”); 
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17  (“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the 
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of 
the ‘contract’”); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 71-72 (1994) (noting 
that “Pennhurst’s contractual characterization of spending conditions has been repeatedly 
reaffirmed” and citing cases); Levy, supra note 193, at 1654-55 (describing Court’s “clear 
statement” limit on spending power, “requiring conditions on federal monies to be explicitly 
stated in the pertinent statutes”). 
 211.  See Hills, supra note 5, at 860-61 (describing system of conditional grants and one-
on-one bargaining between state and federal government over whether to accept conditions 
and apply for funds). 
 212. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (“[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power 
is much in the nature of a contract:  in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with 
federally imposed conditions.”). 
 213.  See Hills, supra note 5, at 822-23 (describing rule); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Accountability and Mandates:  Redefining the Problem of Federal Spending Conditions, 4 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 482 (1995) (“Is it meaningful to conceive of the states as 
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party holds the initial property right, parties will, in the absence of 
transaction costs, negotiate for the most efficient allocation of resources.214  
The contractual view of federalism enhances state autonomy by allowing 
states to accept responsibilities, and the attached funds, even if structural 
limits would seem to prevent such delegation of power. 
B. Conditional Spending Power 
The federal government may constitutionally legislate for the general 
welfare under its spending power, as long as the legislation addresses a 
matter of public concern.215  Public benefits programs, such as Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, are spending power enactments that have withstood constitutional 
challenges.216  The federal government may also exercise its spending 
power to encourage states to adopt various laws and programs by offering 
financial inducements.217  The federal government can offer funds with 
strings attached, thereby effecting state-level legislation, even though 
Congress could not mandate that states enact those laws without violating 
federalism principles.218 
 
bargaining with the federal government?  Can the states protect themselves politically in 
Congress?”). 
 214.  R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (1960), reprinted in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, 
AND THE LAW 95, 102-04 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1988); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8, 55-58 (5th ed. 1998) (applying the Coase theorem, defined 
simply as the notion that “if transactions are costless, the initial assignment of a property right 
will not affect the ultimate use of the property,” to address the problem of incompatible land 
uses); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106 (1972) (“Why cannot 
a society simply decide on the basis of the already mentioned criteria who should receive any 
given entitlement, and then let its transfer occur only through a voluntary negotiation?”); 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 32-38 (1993) (describing the  effect of the 
initial position, or baseline, of rights and bargaining difficulties to discuss the problem of 
“unconstitutional conditions” and the power of the state over individuals). 
 215.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Comm’r v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 
640 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 
 216.  See  Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 725-26  (2006) 
(cataloging federal programs and citing cases involving spending power legislation); A. 
Raymond Randolph, Panel Two: Limits on National Power and Unconstitutional Conditions, 4 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 458 (1995) (examining limits of the federal conditional 
spending power). 
 217. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206-07 (citing cases that exemplify use of the conditional 
spending power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (same). 
 218.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (noting that “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s 
‘enumerated legislative fields’ . . . may nevertheless be attained through the use of the 
spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds”) (citing United States v. Butler, 
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The leading case upholding the federal government’s conditional 
spending power is South Dakota v. Dole.219  The challenged federal law 
conditioned states’ receipt of federal highway funds on states establishing a 
minimum drinking age of twenty-one years.220  Because states could freely 
opt out and maintain laws allowing alcohol sales to younger people, thus 
retaining their state sovereignty, the Court upheld the federal law.221  A pair 
of earlier cases, Commissioner v. Davis222 and Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis,223 authorized use of the federal spending power to achieve regulatory 
ends and held that applying a federal tax on employers to support the 
federal Social Security Act and unemployment compensation funds did not 
violate the Tenth Amendment or impinge unjustifiably on state 
sovereignty.224 
Those and subsequent cases outline the limits of the conditional 
spending power.  First, the exercise of spending power must be in the pursuit 
of “the general welfare.”225  Second, the conditions must be stated 
unambiguously, allowing states to exercise their choice “knowingly, 
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”226  Third, conditional 
spending power projects must be related “to the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs.”227  Finally, the conditional grant of funds 
must not violate other constitutional provisions—the so-called independent 
 
297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 
(1981) (“[O]ur cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall 
disburse federal money to the States.”). 
 219.  483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 220.  Id. at 205. 
 221.  Id. at 211-12 (characterizing condition on funds as “mild encouragement” and 
suggesting that “enactment of [minimum drinking age] remains the prerogative of the States 
not merely in theory but in fact”). 
 222.  301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
 223.  301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
 224.  Davis, 301 U.S. at 645-46 (regarding Social Security Act); Steward Mach. Co., 301 
U.S. at 592-93 (regarding unemployment compensation law).  The cases, decided on the 
same day, overruled United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), where the Court struck down 
provisions of Agricultural Adjustment Act as invading states’ reserved rights.  See generally 
Robert M. Cover, Federalism and Administrative Structure, 92 YALE L.J. 1342, 1342-43 
(1983) (describing cases); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole:  Why the 
Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could 
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 461-69 (2003) (describing Dole and cases in its 
aftermath). 
 225. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Davis, 301 U.S. at 640-41). 
 226. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 227. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality 
opinion)). 
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constitutional bar.228  There may also be a germaneness limit that requires 
the conditions to bear some relationship to the overall purpose of the 
legislation.229 
Dole makes clear a limit on the conditional spending power that is 
particularly relevant to analyzing the constitutionality of the clawback: 
conditions or inducements may be offered to states, but compulsion or 
coercion is unlawful.230  The financial inducement offered by Congress 
might be “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion.’”231  The Dole Court rejected South Dakota’s inference of 
coercion from the fact that the program was very successful, i.e., most states 
agreed to the condition on receipt of highway funds.232  The fact that most 
states go along with an offer does not prove that it is coercive; it may be 
simply that the federal government’s offer is sufficiently attractive to most 
states.233  In addition, requiring states to give up a small percentage of 
federal highway funds if they refuse to abide the minimum drinking age 
does not prove coercion.234  Likewise, it could be argued that the potential 
loss of a small percentage of Medicaid funds if states refuse to pay the 
clawback might not cross the line from pressure into compulsion. 
C. The Clawback and Conditional Spending Power 
As pointed out in the previous Section, the argument can be made that 
the clawback’s effect of withholding a small percentage of federal funds 
from a state that refuses to comply with its mandate is not compulsion.  But 
there are also potential arguments against the constitutionality of the 
clawback under Dole and the conditional spending cases.  In early drafts of 
 
 228. Id. at 208, 210 (discussing limitation); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. 
Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976). 
 229. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09, 208 n.3 (finding limit met on the facts of the case, 
although not holding it is required in all cases); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
167 (1992) (noting that conditions must “bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal 
spending”).  See generally Huberfeld, supra note 45, at 489 n.255 (observing that the 
“germaneness  limit” was “key to Justice O’Connor’s dissent” in Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-14); 
McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 120-21 (noting that Justice Rehnquist’s footnote 
suggests that congressional spending power may be limited by “a requirement that any 
condition attached to a federal grant bear some relationship to that grant” and that Justice 
O’Connor appeared to rely on that limit in her dissent (citations omitted)). 
 230.  But see Baker & Berman, supra note 224, at 467-68 (suggesting that Dole’s 
“coercion” test has failed to operate as a meaningful limit on federal spending power and that 
“lower courts have consistently failed to find impermissible coercion”). 
 231.  Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. (“We cannot conclude . . . that a conditional grant of federal money of this sort is 
unconstitutional simply by reason of its success in achieving the congressional objective.”). 
 234.  Id. 
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the Professors’ Brief, I argued that the clawback failed the Dole limits by 
operating as an ambiguous condition on states’ receipt of federal Medicaid 
funds because the states were not notified of its consequences.  The 
Medicare Part D clawback, and the statutory authority to offset unpaid 
clawback amounts against states’ FMAP, disrupts the fundamental 
“cooperative federalism” Medicaid funding arrangement.235  The clawback 
penalty offset exposes states to the costs of unilaterally funding their 
Medicaid programs without federal contribution for the first time since 
Medicaid’s enactment.  Thus the clawback violates the “contract” that states 
accepted when they first established their state Medicaid programs and were 
promised federal matching grants.  As the Court has clearly stated, 
Congress “did not intend a participating State to assume a unilateral 
funding obligation for any health service in an approved Medicaid plan.”236  
Up to the amount of the penalty, states’ Medicaid spending will be 
unmatched by federal dollars, contrary to the statutory requirements, 
congressional intent, and recognized judicial limits. 
My argument, however, was incompatible with the States’ 
intergovernmental tax immunity argument that the clawback operated as a 
mandatory tax on states qua states.  It would be inconsistent to suggest, on 
the one hand, that the clawback was an unconstitutional condition on grant 
of federal funds, and, on the other hand, that it was an unconditional 
federal tax on state governments.237  For reasons discussed in more detail 
below, I continue to find merit in the Dole arguments against the clawback 
and encourage future litigants to consider them as a potentially fruitful line 
of objection to the funding mechanism’s continued operation. 
1. The clawback exceeds congressional spending power. 
The Medicaid program is a federal spending power program that 
extends federal dollars to states on the condition that they establish state 
Medicaid plans in compliance with certain federal requirements and 
mandates.238  Conditions on Medicaid funding include providing certain 
mandatory services to certain categories of beneficiaries.239  The Medicaid 
program has never required states to fund most of the costs of a separate 
 
 235.  See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 138 (noting that “[s]ince the founding of the 
Republic, the federal and state governments have worked interactively to expand health care 
coverage to increasingly larger swaths of the poor and near-poor population” and that “MMA 
represents a major change in federal-state relations”). 
 236. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309 (1980) (emphasis added). 
 237.  See States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 15 n.10. 
 238.  See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002) (recognizing Medicaid as 
spending power legislation); see also Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156-57 (1986). 
 239.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2000). 
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federal program as a condition of federal matching dollars.  To the 
contrary, the Medicaid statute promises open-ended federal funding to 
match states’ spending on a dollar-for-dollar percentage basis, without 
caps, as long as the state spending is for an approved Medicaid program 
that complies with federal requirements.240 
The Part D clawback and corresponding automatic penalty for 
nonpayment, an offset against otherwise due federal Medicaid matching 
dollars, operate together as a new, unconstitutional condition on states’ 
Medicaid participation.  The Part D statute expressly provides: “As a 
condition of its State plan under [Medicaid] and receipt of any Federal 
financial assistance under [Medicaid],” states must comply with certain 
requirements, including the clawback and offset provisions.241  The 
clawback is unconstitutional because it does not provide adequate, 
unambiguous notice of the condition, allowing states freely to exercise the 
choice to decline federal funding. 
2. The clawback fails to provide clear notice of the consequences of 
Medicaid participation. 
The clawback fails the second Dole limit, which requires the conditions 
on federal grants to be unambiguous, allowing states to exercise their 
choices knowingly, aware of the consequences of participation.242  States 
were entirely blindsided by the new condition on Medicaid participation.  
The Part D statutory provision that allows federal authorities to collect the 
unpaid clawback amount, plus interest, through an automatic and 
immediate offset of Medicaid funding otherwise due, deprives states of the 
opportunity to opt into Medicaid, fully aware of the consequences of 
participation.243 
The clawback is a new condition on federal dollars, enacted long after 
all states already had agreed to participate in the Medicaid program and 
comply with the broad federal requirements.  The federal government 
cannot constitutionally impose a substantial, ex post facto condition on 
Medicaid funding.244  The only way for states to exercise their sovereign 
 
 240. See NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, THE BASICS: MEDICAID FINANCING 1 (Sept. 13, 2006), 
available at www.nhpf.org/pdfs_basics/Basics_MedicaidFinancing_09-13-06.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2007). 
 241.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(a), (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C) (2000) (emphasis added).  Likewise, 
the legislative history of the clawback expressly provides: “The provision establishes certain 
requirements, as a condition of receiving federal Medicaid assistance,” to share certain costs 
of the new Part D benefit.  H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at 509 (2003) (Conf. Rep.). 
 242.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).  See generally Huberfeld, supra note 45. 
 243.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C). 
 244.  See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1988). 
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discretion, from now on, is to opt out of the Medicaid program entirely.245  
States could not possibly have been cognizant that Medicaid participation 
required them to fund a separate, expanded federal Medicare benefit.  
Therefore, the condition fails the Dole test. 
3. The clawback passes the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion. 
Dole also provides that federal spending power is exceeded if the 
financial inducement that Congress offers leaves states effectively no choice 
but to participate.  Conditions on federal grants may be unconstitutional if 
they are so “coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion.’”246  Nevertheless, Congress may “encourage” activity through 
the spending power that it could not compel pursuant to other powers.  In 
Dole, the court held that conditioning federal highway funds on states 
enacting a minimum drinking age operated as “relatively mild 
encouragement to the States.”247 
A condition becomes unduly coercive if it leaves states with no option to 
avoid the federal demand.  Moreover, a choice between two 
unconstitutional conditions is no choice at all.  In New York v. United States, 
the State of New York challenged certain federal environmental laws 
involving radioactive waste disposal.  The federal law required states to take 
responsibility for low-level radioactive waste generated within their 
borders.248  The law offered various incentives to encourage states to 
comply with their statutory obligation.  Together, the incentives effectively left 
states with the choice to either implement the federal regulatory scheme or 
take title to radioactive waste and pay all fines and damages as if the state 
itself generated or owned the waste.249  Likewise, here, states face two 
options that effectively leave them no choice.  On the one hand, states can 
pay the demanded clawback, or, on the other hand, they can assume full 
financial responsibility for their Medicaid programs.  The first option is not a 
choice but merely a mandate.  The second option directly contradicts the 
Court’s clear recognition that Congress did not intend for states to bear the 
burden of unilaterally funding Medicaid services: 
 
 245.  See Huberfeld, supra note 45, at 482 (noting that “[i]f states do not pay the federal 
government the ‘clawback’ amount, they stand to lose all of their federal Medicaid funding”). 
 246. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 
(1937)). 
 247. Id. 
 248. 505 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1992). 
 249. Id. at 175-76. (“A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory 
techniques is no choice at all.”) 
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The Medicaid program is one of federal and state cooperation in funding 
medical assistance; a complete withdrawal of the federal prop in the system 
with the intent to drop the total cost of providing the service upon the states, 
runs directly counter to the basic structure of the program and could 
seriously cripple a state’s attempts to provide other necessary medical 
services embraced by its plan.250 
In sum, the Part D clawback and automatic offset penalty operate as a 
condition on Medicaid matching dollars that states have no choice but to 
accept.  Accordingly, the clawback turns strong pressure into compulsion by 
leaving states no choice but to pay the demanded amount to support the 
federal prescription drug benefit.  The only way to avoid the clawback is to 
opt out of the federal program.  States choosing not to pay the clawback 
could continue to provide healthcare benefits to their residents, free of any 
requirements under the federal Medicaid statute, but with no federal 
financial support. 
All states have established and administered state Medicaid programs 
over many years.  Those choosing not to accept the clawback condition 
would be forced to dismantle a broad, essential medical insurance program 
for the states’ poorest residents and expose themselves to statutory 
entitlement, constitutional due process, and other legal challenges from 
patients and providers suddenly left out in the cold.251  Alternatively, states 
could assume the entire cost of maintaining their existing Medicaid 
programs.  But continuing to fund a fully state program that previously 
received substantial federal financial assistance is a solution that hamstrings 
state budgetary and administrative discretion. 
4. The clawback is an unconstitutional, retroactive condition. 
Even when viewed as a condition on Medicaid participation, the 
clawback is a new, potentially onerous condition about which states had no 
notice at the time they agreed to accept federal Medicaid grants.252  
Accordingly, states could not have possibly knowingly and voluntarily agreed 
to this condition, fully cognizant of its consequences.  State Medicaid 
funding can be pulled for noncompliance through the automatic offset of 
amounts otherwise due.253  Thus, the clawback also effectively denies States 
a promised portion of FMAP. 
 
 250.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309 n.12 (1980) (citing Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 
591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1979)). 
 251.  See, e.g., Barbara R. Grumet, Who is “Due” Process?, 42 PUB. ADM. REV. 321, 323 
(1982) (describing the property interest created by Medicare’s and Medicaid’s entitlement 
nature). 
 252.  See supra Part III.B. 
 253.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(A), (C). 
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The clawback effectively imposed a new, retroactive condition on 
Medicaid participation that is contrary to the Dole “unambiguous condition” 
or “clear statement” limit.254  In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman,255 the State of Pennsylvania faced a challenge from a state 
resident and recipient of residential services for the mentally retarded who 
claimed that the state failed to provide “appropriate treatment” in the “least 
restrictive” environment, as required by the federal Developmentally 
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.256  Under this congressional 
spending power Act, states could receive federal financial assistance for 
creating programs to care for and treat persons with developmental 
disabilities.257 
The Court rejected the resident’s claim, however, on the grounds that 
“findings” in the Act did not operate as conditions on federal funding but, 
rather, as general statements of federal policy.258  A federal statute can 
impose conditions on granting funds to states only if Congress 
unambiguously expressed intent to do so,259 which it did not do here.  This 
rule operates on the premise that Congress knows how to explicitly state 
conditions on funding, so statements may be deemed merely precatory if 
 
 254.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending 
Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1188-89, 1198-201 (2001) (describing Pennhurst doctrine and 
requirement that conditions be “unambiguously expressed”).  Constitutional principles of 
fairness and due process generally oppose retroactive laws.  See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. 
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-10, 213-15 (1988) (disallowing HCFA’s retroactive promulgation 
of wage index rules to adjust hospital reimbursement); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 
511 U.S. 244, 263-64 (1994) (recognizing a presumption against retroactivity; firmly rooted 
in jurisprudence; fairness). 
 255.  451 U.S. at 1. 
 256.  Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486, 502 (1975) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
6010 but omitted by amendment in 1984).  This provision contained congressional findings 
respecting rights of the developmentally disabled similar to those found in 42 U.S.C. § 6009 
(2000). 
 257.  Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 11. 
 258.  Id. at 19 (reading section 6010 in the context of “other, more specific provisions of 
the Act, does no more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment.  
It is simply a general statement of ‘findings’ and, as such, is too thin a reed to support the 
rights and obligations read into it by the court below”); see also Note, Making the Old 
Federalism Work:  Section 1983 and the Rights of Grant-in-Aid Beneficiaries, 92 YALE L.J. 
1001, 1006-07 (1983) (describing Court’s holding that Act was “a ‘mere federal-state 
funding statute,’ intended to encourage but not to coerce, the states to develop certain 
programs” (citations omitted)). 
 259.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.  See generally 42 U.S.C 1396u-5 (2000). 
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they do not make conditions explicit.260  The Court concluded that the Act’s 
provisions did not create enforceable rights.261  The language fell well short 
of providing clear notice to states that they would have to comply with them 
to receive federal funds.262  Pennhurst also recognized that Congress cannot 
require states to comply with new, retroactive conditions, after they have 
already accepted federal funds.263 
The unambiguous condition or clear statement rule comports with the 
contract view of federalism.  The legitimacy of an offer turns on whether a 
state “voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”264  
There can be no knowing acceptance if states are unaware or unable to 
ascertain what is expected of them.265  But if states do receive clear, 
unambiguous notice of the terms of the contract, this view seems to say they 
could freely acquiesce to even onerous conditions.266  To deny states the 
possibility of that choice, on structural federalism grounds, would violate 
state autonomy.  If the conditions are clear and sufficiently attractive to 
states, they should have the option to accept them.267 
The clawback violates both the clear statement rule and the retroactivity 
principle.  States cannot knowingly and voluntarily agree to a condition of 
which they were unaware at the time they accepted federal Medicaid funds.  
There was no clear—nor, indeed, any—notice of the clawback condition at 
the time that the states accepted federal funds.  Therefore, states could not 
choose to opt out of Medicaid to avoid the consequences of the condition.  
Futhermore, the clawback operates retroactively because it was imposed 
after states agreed to accept Medicaid funds.  Even if states could be 
deemed aware in year 2007 and forward, the condition would be coercive 
 
 260.  Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18; see Smith, supra note 254, at 1199 (noting Court’s 
conclusion that “findings” in section 6010 did not create rights but “were mere precatory 
statements by Congress”). 
 261. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 25 (“Though Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it 
does not include surprising participating States with post acceptance or ‘retroactive’ 
conditions.”). 
 264. Id. at 17; see also Huberfeld, supra note 45, at 448 (describing Pennhurst and noting 
that “[i]n analyzing the ability of Congress to place conditions on the use of federal funds, the 
Court emphasized a now-familiar analogy that Spending Clause legislation is ‘in the nature of 
a contract.’”); Engdahl, supra note 210, at 70-72 (discussing Pennhurst as contractual limit 
on federal spending power). 
 265. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
 266. See id. 
 267. See Hills, supra note 5, at 822-23; Engdahl, supra note 210, at 71 ( “What makes 
such conditions obligatory is that essence as contract, wholly apart from the circumstance that 
they happen to be spelled out as a statute or an agency rule.  Although articulated in a statute 
or rule, they have no force as ‘law’; their only force is contractual.”) 
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at that point because states would have no choice but to comply or 
restructure and fully fund state welfare programs.268 
Conditions on federal grants that operate retroactively or fail to give 
states clear notice of the consequences of participation violate the contract 
view of federalism.269  States cannot freely and voluntarily agree to enter a 
contract with the federal government to assume federal regulatory functions 
if they do not know the contractual terms.270  In traditional contract law, 
courts may declare a contract void if the terms are hidden or ambiguous.271  
In addition, one party would not be permitted to enforce a new, substantive 
provision of the contract against the other party without that party’s 
agreement to be bound by the new term.272  States did not receive clear 
notice of the clawback as a condition of FMAP and were not given an 
opportunity to decide whether to accept the new condition before the 
federal government demanded payment.273  Thus, the clawback is an 
unconstitutional exercise of federal spending power. 
D. Commandeering 
The States raised a different federalism argument than the argument that 
I advanced above that the clawback exceeds the Dole limits on conditional 
spending power.  In their intergovernmental tax immunity argument, the 
States urged that the clawback was not a condition on federal Medicaid 
money but a mandatory tax.274  Accordingly, they could not then argue that 
the clawback was an ambiguous or otherwise unconstitutional condition.  
Instead, the States argued that the clawback “commandeered” state 
legislative and budgetary processes, requiring them to allocate an 
undeterminable portion of state budgets to fund the federal prescription 
drug benefit.275  The Court had previously recognized that Congress could 
 
 268. See supra notes 246-251 and accompanying text (describing “pressure turns to 
compulsion” arguments). 
 269. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25. 
 270. See id. at 17. 
 271. See, e.g., Local Motion, Inc. v. Niescher, 105 F.3d 1278, 1280 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(“The presence of an ambiguous material term may indicate that no meeting of the minds 
occurred when the document was signed.”); 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 
4.10 (rev. ed. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981) (regarding effect of 
misunderstanding). 
 272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (1981) (regarding acceptance of offer). 
 273. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 137 (discussing states’ loss of Medicaid 
federal matching funds as result of MMA). 
 274. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 275. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing States’ argument).  For similar successful arguments, 
see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (regarding unconstitutional obligations 
placed on local officers under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (regarding unconstitutionality of toxic waste take-title). 
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not commandeer state legislatures to implement a federal regulatory 
scheme for low-level radioactive waste276 or enlist state law enforcement 
officers to execute federal handgun control law by performing background 
checks on prospective handgun purchasers.277  In both cases, the Court 
recognized that Congress cannot “conscript” state governments or officers 
to carry out federal legislation.278 
In a sense, New York, Printz, and the commandeering line of cases, 
represent not so much a new limit on federal spending power, but another 
way to think about the ultimate limit in Dole.  That is, when does pressure 
turn to compulsion and thus commandeering?  In some cases, Congress 
may attempt to directly conscript state legislative or executive functions to 
carry out a federal regulatory scheme.  In other cases, Congress may 
ostensibly hold out a federal funding “carrot” to encourage state 
participation in a federal program.  But when the carrot is one that states 
simply cannot afford to refuse, the offer turns from a conditional grant into 
commandeering.  As one commentary summarized, “The basis of the 
Court’s holding [in Dole] is that there is a difference between coercing 
compliance (an exercise of regulatory power) and buying compliance (an 
exercise of the spending power).”279  When a condition leaves states not 
merely with a hard choice, but with no choice at all about whether to accept 
federal funds, the program becomes commandeering.280 
The commandeering cases involve congressional attempts to enlarge 
federal power and encroach on the states’ reserved powers.  Under this 
structural view of federal-state relations, commandeering is unconstitutional 
because Congress cannot interfere with states’ autonomy, and states 
“cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond 
those enumerated in the Constitution,”281 even if attractive incentives for 
doing so exist.  Structural limits prohibit states from assuming certain federal 
 
 276. New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
 277. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 278. New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (“Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause 
Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its 
agents.”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the 
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program.  Today we hold that Congress cannot 
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly.”); see Evan Caminker, 
The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1075 
(1997) (suggesting that the “Supreme Court has held that principles of state sovereignty 
preclude Congress from ‘commandee[ring] the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a regulatory program’”) (quoting New York, 505 U.S. 
at 161); Sarnoff, supra note 5, at 207 (noting that New York clarified that Congress may not 
direct state legislatures to implement federal programs). 
 279. See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 101. 
 280. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
 281. New York, 505 U.S. at 182. 
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powers, even voluntarily.282  The rationale for enforcing structural limits on 
states assuming federal powers is grounded in political accountability, a sort 
of federalism “hot potato” for controversial reforms.283  Without structural 
limits, the federal government could enact sweeping reforms and require 
states to implement them, thereby avoiding accountability for 
implementation decisions, such as where to locate a radioactive waste 
disposal site or restricting handgun availability.  States, on the other hand, 
might disavow responsibility for the disposal site’s location or the difficulty of 
obtaining firearms by claiming to act under congressional directive.284  
Citizens, accordingly, are left with no one willing to accept responsibility for 
the unpopular or controversial decision. 
The structural view purports to protect states’ “retained sovereignty” by 
allowing them to “remain independent and autonomous within their proper 
sphere of authority.”285  Compelling, commandeering, or leaving states with 
no real choice but to participate in a federal regulatory program “reduce[s] 
the states to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.”286  But, I suggest that 
denying states the option to implement a federal program, especially when 
attractive, yet onerous, incentives are offered, undermines states’ autonomy 
by disallowing them to freely and voluntarily enter certain “contracts” with 
the federal government. 
If federalism is viewed as a contract, then states are entitled to assume 
responsibility for administering, funding, or implementing federal regulatory 
programs if doing so is in their interest.  The baseline is that states, not the 
federal government, hold the entitlement to deny federal government use of 
a state regulatory apparatus.287  Under this view, state autonomy and 
reserved powers are preserved because states make the choice.  They can 
freely refuse to participate but can also freely agree to assume federal 
 
 282. Id. at 181-82. 
 283. See Zelinsky, supra note 213, at 482 (“Federal spending conditions frequently blur 
lines of accountability, making it difficult for citizens to discern who is making the policy 
impacting upon them.”), 485 (“New York v. United States reflects an understanding that 
federally-imposed mandates improperly reduce the accountability of officeholders, forcing 
state and local officials to bear the political costs of decisions made in Washington.”); Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 182, at 1347 (suggesting that conditional spending legislation “is 
relatively easy for Congrss [sic] to pass because legislators can take credit for bold, new 
initiatives without having to face up to the problem of finding tax money to cover the costs of 
those programs”); Cover, supra note 224, at 1343 (“By debilitating, if not disarming, the 
alternative sources of political power in our federal structure, ‘cooperative federalism’ 
undermines the only viable restraint on the congressional exercise of enumerated powers: the 
political process.”). 
 284. See New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83. 
 285. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997). 
 286. Brown v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 287. See Hills, supra note 5, at 822-23. 
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powers.  The structural view, by contrast, denies states the entitlement to 
assume powers considered in the exclusive province of the federal 
government, based on formal constitutional grounds, and removes from 
states’ consideration a whole range of potentially attractive programs and 
incentives. 
Applied to the clawback, however, the States made a valid argument 
under the commandeering line of cases.  As discussed above under the 
Dole limits,288 the clawback passed the line between pressure and coercion 
because states received no notice of the new condition on Medicaid 
participation.  States have to pay the demanded clawback amount, with no 
opportunity to review, object to, or appeal the demand to perpetually 
support an expansive and expensive new federal benefit.  The only choice 
remaining to states that do not wish to pay is to cease participation in the 
Medicaid program and decline all federal monies.  That option is practically 
impossible for most states from humanitarian, budgetary, and liability 
perspectives.  Accordingly, the clawback is an unconstitutional exercise of 
federal spending power. 
E. Commerce Power 
Although not directly on point but still useful to the analysis, Supreme 
Court cases on the limits of the commerce power delineate federal and state 
governments’ respective powers.  United States v. Lopez brought a sea 
change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence by invalidating a congressional 
enactment under the commerce power, for the first time in nearly sixty 
years.289  Lopez involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 
1990,290 a federal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause that made 
possessing a firearm in a school zone a federal crime.  The Court struck 
down the law on the ground that possession of firearms within a school zone 
 
 288. See supra Part IV.A (describing alternative argument that States could not proffer, 
without contradicting intergovernmental tax immunity argument). 
 289. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  The Court’s decision in 
NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), is generally regarded as the case in 
which the Court began to move away from a restrictive definition of interstate commerce and 
towards the “zenith” of  the commerce power under Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  
See McAllister, supra note 193, at 217 (“In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, for the first time in a long time, held that Congress had exceeded its 
constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause . . . .”), 223-24 (discussing the 
Commerce Clause “Modern Era,” beginning with Jones & Laughlin and culminating in 
Wickard v. Filburn); see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
106-07 (Foundation Press 16th ed.). 
 290. 18 U.S.C. §922(q) (1994), invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995). 
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did not have a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.291  Thus, the law 
exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and unconstitutionally 
encroached on states’ police powers.292  Subsequent congressional attempts 
to regulate social problems have met a similar fate.293 
Like the spending power cases, the commerce power cases struggle to 
define the line between federal enumerated and state reserved powers.  For 
many years, the test was whether the area of regulation fell within 
“traditional state powers.”294  Activities typical of state and local 
governments include fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public 
health, and parks.  Accordingly, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the 
Court held that federal laws mandating employment terms could not apply 
to state and local employees because employer-employee relationships 
were within states’ traditional powers.295 
Several years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority,296 the Court overruled Usery and rejected the traditional state 
powers distinction as unworkable.297  The  Court “reject[ed], as unsound in 
principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal 
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular 
governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”298  The Usery test left too 
many gray areas and failed to allow for state powers to evolve over time.  
After rejecting that approach, the Court held that federal fair labor 
standards did not violate the federal commerce power, even as applied to 
states.299 
 
 291. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.  But see Filburn, 317 U.S. at 128 (holding that home-
grown wheat could be regulated under commerce power “substantial effects” test). 
 292. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568, 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing structural 
limits of federal power and states’ reserved powers). 
 293. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down federal 
Violence Against Women Act); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921-22 
(discussing constitutional system of dual sovereignty).  But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005) (holding that Congress may ban use of marijuana even where states have deemed it 
legal for medicinal uses). 
 294. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (striking down federal 
minimum wage and maximum hour standards as applied to states and their subdivisions). 
 295. Id. at 851-52; McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 93-94 (discussing “traditional 
governmental functions” test and suggesting that Usery was the only case in which the Court 
used it to invalidate national legislation). 
 296. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding application of federal minimum wage and overtime 
pay laws to metropolitan transit authority); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 94-96 
(suggesting that Usery “was destined for failure from the start”). 
 297. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-47. 
 298. Id. at 546-47. 
 299. Id. at 548, 554. 
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Garcia offered a different approach to determining limits on federal 
power to regulate states, suggesting that the limits inhere in the federal 
government’s structure, particularly the representative Congress and political 
process.  Rather than defining the scope of federal power through judicially 
created limitations, the Court suggested that “[s]tate sovereign interests . . . 
are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the 
structure of the federal system.”300  The Court asserted that states are 
adequately protected at the federal level through elected representatives 
who participate in one branch of the federal government.301  The Court 
demonstrated this approach’s effectiveness in preserving state sovereignty by 
noting that states have obtained substantial federal funding for a range of 
“traditional” state services, including “police and fire protection, education, 
public health and hospitals, parks and recreation, and sanitation.”302  In 
other words, state representatives were politically effective in securing 
advantages for their citizens.  If the political system functions as intended, 
there should be no need to carve out a rigid zone of protection for 
traditional state functions.303  States, through their elected congressional 
representatives, should be able to freely lobby and vote for laws that would 
best serve them and their constituents.304 
The more flexible Garcia test for the scope of state and federal powers is 
consistent with the contractual view of federalism, which supports states’ 
autonomy to accept or decline federal incentives to enact certain regulations 
or acquiesce to federal powers to enforce a federal law.305  But it does not 
relegate states’ powers to only the “traditional” state functions identified by 
the Court in prior cases.306  Although Garcia suggests that the structure of 
government is the source of the protection for state sovereignty, it is not an 
inflexible rule.307  Separation of powers and representative democracy are 
the structural basis, instead of an arbitrary definition of what states 
traditionally do.308 
 
 300. Id. at 552. 
 301. Id.; see also McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 123 (“Dole in effect relegates 
disputes over relative spheres of authority to the political process.”). 
 302. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-53. 
 303. See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 94. 
 304. Id. at 96-97 (characterizing Garcia “as a return to the delegation construct” and 
shifting “focus not upon whether the enactment infringed some core state power, but upon 
whether the enactment was a proper subject of federal regulation.”). 
 305. See supra Part IV.A.2. (discussing contractual view of federalism). 
 306. See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); United Transp. 
Union v. Long Island R.R.  455 U.S. 678 (1982) (operation of railroads not traditional state 
function). 
 307. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554; Smith, supra note 254, at 1202, 1213. 
 308. Smith, supra note 254, at 1213. 
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If protection of state sovereignty rides on the federal system’s structure, 
then it is even more important that states’ elected representatives receive 
clear, unambiguous notice of the terms of the “contract” offered so they can 
make an informed decision to accept or decline it.  Accordingly, the 
Pennhurst “clear statement” limit on cooperative federal-state legislation is 
essential to the Garcia approach.309  A state representative cannot 
adequately protect state sovereignty if he or she is unaware of the terms of a 
proposal that requires states to enforce or enact federal laws. 
The clawback seems to violate both the old Usery traditional state 
functions test and Garcia’s structural approach to federalism.  As the States’ 
Petition argued, managing budgets and appropriations for state programs 
are core state functions.310  Those processes may be even more traditional 
state powers than managing public-employee working conditions and terms, 
which was the power at issue in Usery.  Accordingly, the clawback would 
readily fail the Usery limit on federal power. 
The clawback also runs afoul of federalism under Garcia’s structural-
political approach.  Members of Congress could not effectively serve their 
constituents’ interests without clear, prior notice of the clawback condition 
on Medicaid participation when the Social Security Act was passed and 
states agreed to accept federal dollars based on the conditions therein.  
Regarding the enactment of the clawback itself, states were represented in 
Congress when the MMA was debated and finalized.311  But the clawback 
was an eleventh-hour amendment that ran awry of both the Senate and 
House versions of the bill.312  Although the MMA calls it the “phased down 
state percentage,” the clawback was, perhaps, more accurately 
characterized in the legislative history as the “phased-in” assumption of 
federal administrative costs of the new drug benefit.313  Despite the statutory 
language, the MMA’s proponents never intended to phase out states’ 
substantial funding requirement or shift the cost of the federal benefit to the 
federal budget.314  If a federal program’s conditions are not made clear to 
states, the political process “check” on federal power, endorsed by Garcia, 
fails to protect state sovereignty.  Just as Dole and Pennhurst require clear 
notice of conditions on federal grants, Garcia requires clear notice of the 
 
 309. Id. at 1202-03 (suggesting that “Pennhurst’s clear statement rule . . . ensures that the 
structural protections on which the Court relied in Garcia operate properly”); see also supra 
notes 221-236 and accompanying text (describing Pennhurst and Dole limits on conditional 
spending power). 
 310. See supra Part III.B. (describing the States’ substantive arguments). 
 311. See generally Louise M. Slaughter, supra note 26 (describing the political process that 
passed Part D). 
 312. See supra Part II (describing legislative history of clawback). 
 313. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 136-37. 
 314. Id. 
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terms of legislation for the constitutional limits on federal power to operate 
effectively.  The clawback, thus, violates state sovereignty under both 
analyses. 
V.  CLAWBACK FEDERALISM 
In sum, the MMA clawback is a departure from traditional “cooperative 
federalism” legislation in several respects.  First, it inverts the usual funding 
relationship.  In conditional spending legislation, the federal government 
offers money to states as incentive to implement federal regulatory priorities 
and encourage “enlarged activity” in state programs consistent with the 
federal agenda.  These federal grants allow states to pursue policies that 
they otherwise might not have been able to achieve at the state level.315  
While under the original Medicaid Act, states may receive federal funds to 
match state money spent on Medicaid programs, under the clawback, states 
give money to the federal government to support an enlarged and over-
budget federal program.  In addition, the clawback may compromise state 
programs because state funds have to be re-allocated to satisfy the federal 
payment demand. 
The clawback also undermines accountability at both the federal and 
state levels.316  The federal government insulated itself from backlash about 
Part D’s price tag by shifting a substantial portion of the cost to the states.  
States face potential objections from state residents about the program’s 
cost but have no way of responding to constituents’ objections or effectively 
managing their state budgets under the clawback.  Thus, the clawback 
exceeds structural and political checks on federal power and leaves states 
powerless to meet their residents’ interests.317 
Furthermore, the clawback denies states autonomy.  The formula and 
factors for calculating the clawback are wholly within federal authorities’ 
control.  The statute does not provide a means to challenge or appeal the 
demand and denies states any administrative or budgetary discretion with 
respect to the payment.  If states do not pay, the amount due is 
automatically extracted from their federal Medicaid matching dollars. 
States have no real choice but to pay the clawback.  The only way to 
avoid paying it is to opt out of Medicaid altogether.  Choosing this option, 
however, would force states to fully fund their existing Medicaid programs 
without federal financial support or drastically reduce or eliminate benefits, 
on pain of possible liability to program beneficiaries and providers.  Thus, 
 
 315. Strong, supra note 132, at 501-02. 
 316. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (describing accountability objections to 
conditional spending programs and citing sources). 
 317. See supra notes 298-316 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
128 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:79 
the clawback seems to exceed Congress’s spending power because it gives 
states no choice but to comply with a condition on federal grants.318 
Because states have no real choice, the clawback violates the contract 
view of federalism.  Whether construed as a mandatory tax, commandeering 
of state budgetary processes, or a condition that lacks a clear statement or 
operates retroactively, the clawback is not a valid exercise of the federal 
power to tax and spend for the general welfare.  The contract notion of 
federalism presumes that states hold the entitlement to accept or refuse to 
take on federal regulatory responsibilities.319  Although not structurally 
barred from doing so, states can validly agree to enter such a contract only 
if clearly informed of the terms, in advance.  The clawback violates the basic 
contract by leaving states without notice of the contract terms and no real 
choice about whether to accept them. 
The structural view of federalism is also violated.  Just as the structural 
separation of powers under the Constitution prohibits Congress from 
delegating federal legislative power to executive branch authorities, 
structural federalism limits in the Constitution prohibit the federal 
government from delegating federal powers and obligations to states, even 
if states chose to accept them.320  With the clawback, Congress delegated to 
the states the responsibility for appropriations to expand federal health and 
welfare programs.  Providing the funds for a federal program seems to fall 
clearly within the federal powers and, thus, cannot constitutionally be 
assigned to the states. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Medicaid is a traditional conditional funding program and represents an 
established, relatively uncontroversial example of cooperative federalism.  
States agree to implement state healthcare programs consistent with broad 
federal guidelines in exchange for federal funding.  The conditional funding 
approach respects state sovereignty by allowing states to refuse to 
participate as long as they are willing to turn down the federal dollars.  The 
clawback, however, differs significantly from traditional conditional funding 
structures and disrupts the accepted cooperative federalism structures of the 
Medicaid program.  States agreed to establish their state programs under 
the assumption that they would receive federal matching dollars, on a 
percentage basis, for every state dollar spent on Medicaid, including 
medical care and prescription drugs for dually eligible beneficiaries.  The 
clawback alters the federal end of the bargain because states no longer 
 
 318. See supra Parts III.B.2. & IV.D. (describing Dole and commandeering arguments). 
 319. See supra Part IV.A.2. (describing Hills’ “functional” theory of federalism). 
 320. See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text (describing non-delegation doctrine 
analogy). 
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receive a portion of promised federal funding, namely the federal dollars 
based on dually eligible beneficiaries’ prescription drug costs.  Moreover, 
states now must pay the federal government for the entire cost of dual 
eligibles’ drugs.  Adding insult to injury, states that refuse or are unable to 
pay the clawback lose all federal Medicaid funding. 
Recent state healthcare reform efforts to achieve universal coverage and 
federal proposals to expand government programs and coordinate tax and 
other market incentives with state plans will likely raise additional, unique 
cooperative federalism questions.321  With the Part D clawback, the federal 
government sought to claim credit for implementing broad national 
healthcare reforms while leaving the financial burden of the sweeping new 
benefit on states.  Similar legislation seems likely, given the continuing 
healthcare funding challenges and demand for reform.  Therefore, the 
clawback provision merits closer analysis than the Supreme Court’s cursory 
denial or review, even if states do not pursue the litigation in lower courts, 
before Congress implements similar mechanisms in the current wave of 
reform efforts. 
 
 321. For a discussion of similar federalism implications for watershed healthcare reform 
efforts under the Clinton Administration, see Rich & White, supra note 115, at 861-62 (“As a 
society, we have witnessed several negotiations and renegotiations over what the appropriate 
or proper mix should be between federal, state, and local government ‘interventions,’ on the 
one hand, and the role of the private sector and the free market, on the other.”). 
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